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1.1 BACKGROUND
In developing countries, including India, the cost of healthcare is mainly paid out-of-
pocket (OOP) at the point of service delivery. This fact persists despite the attempt to 
create publicly financed health centres as these health centres often do not provide 
proximate services, or indeed the expected level of quantity or quality of healthcare 
because of poor staffing, equipment or stock of medicines etc. (Dalal & Dawad 2009, GOI 
2008, De Costa & Diwan 2007, Kotwani et al. 2007, NCMH 2005, Satpathy 2005, Kamat 
1995). The OOP expenditures reach on average up to 50% of total health expenditures 
in low income countries;  In India, more than 60% of total health expenditures is paid 
OOP (Figure 1.1) (World Bank 2012). Member States of the World Health Organization 
committed in 2005 to develop their health financing systems so that all people would 
have access to services and would not suffer financial hardship paying for them (World 
Health Assembly resolution 58.33). The preferred health financing policies to reduce 
OOP spending and achieve universal coverage have been risk pooling and health insur-
ance mechanisms (James & Savedoff 2010, WHO 2010).
The Indian health insurance scenario is a mix of mandatory social health insurance 
(SHI) for a small minority of government employees, employer based schemes (mainly 
in multinational companies in the formal sector), voluntary private health insurance, 
state or central government sponsored schemes, and health micro insurance in the 
informal sector (mostly Community-Based Health Insurance - CBHI) (Reddy et al. 2011b, 
Devadasan 2006, WHO 2004a). This thesis focuses on the rural poor in India. These rural 
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poor have no access to SHI or employer based schemes, as the vast majority lives and 
works in the informal sector (Devadasan 2006, NCMH 2005). Private insurance compa-
nies and their agents are reluctant to offer policies in rural areas due to high transaction 
costs and lack of local information. Since 2007 some state governments have introduced 
insurance schemes targeting poor households and in 2008 central government started 
the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) scheme for the same target population. Most 
of these schemes cover only inpatient tertiary care; RSBY includes inpatient secondary 
care. In addition, the outreach is in most states still quite low, especially in rural areas 
(Reddy et al. 2011b). Thus, for the rural poor populations, the most viable option to get 
health insurance coverage is through CBHI (Bhat & Jain 2006, Ahuja 2005, Ahuja 2004, 
Gumber 2002). 
In this thesis CBHI is defined as voluntary, group-based, self-help insurance schemes 
for which the group is involved at least in the design of the benefit package, and prob-
ably also in premium setting and in claims settlement (Dror In Press, Dror & Jacquier 
1999). This definition departs from classical demand-driven market theory which views 
the individual as formulating demand, whereas here the group takes that role, and group 
demand reflects its aptitude to pool both risks and resources in order to provide protec-
tion to all members. This definition can be viewed as applying the subsidiarity principle 
(that decisions should be taken at the lowest level where they can be taken), which 
manifests itself in the following ways: the insurance is contextualized to local levels of 
willingness to pay, local needs and priorities of the specific community in question, and 
there is no competition among suppliers of health insurance, considering that people 
in the informal sector are unable to buy commercial forms of health insurance. The 
schemes are voluntary, with premiums suited to people with low incomes and designed 
to benefit the insured (Dror In Press). 
As shown in Figure 1.2, four main models of delivery of health micro insurance can be 
identified: (i) the partner-agent model, (ii) the provider-driven model, (iii) the charitable 
insurance model and (iv) the mutual/community-based health insurance model (Rader-
macher & Dror 2006). All four models follow some of the principles described above, 
but only the mutual model follows all principles. Therefore the main focus of this thesis 
is on the design of CBHI according to the mutual model. In practice CBHI schemes can 
operate as mixtures of the different models and lessons learned in this thesis can also be 
useful in the other three models wherever appropriate. 
In the partner-agent model any organization with close contacts to the rural and 
low-income target population is the intermediary (the agent) between the policyholder 
and an external insurance company (the partner). The insurance company is solely 
responsible for designing, pricing and underwriting of products, and for maintaining 
solvency in the long-term. In the provider-driven model a healthcare provider (e.g. 
hospital, clinic) launches an insurance scheme. Clients pay a premium to the healthcare 
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provider, enabling them to consume health services, and often access is limited to that 
facility. In the charitable insurance model an external charitable organization acts as 
insurer (not-for-profit), performs all activities of the business process and is responsible 
for the long-term sustainability of the scheme usually by supplementing the payment of 
premiums through external donors (Radermacher & Dror 2006). 
The mutual model operates on the basis that the risk of the insurance is borne by 
the insured. Such CBHI schemes usually operate with small, local groups formed as ex-
tensions of social ties developed in day-to-day interactions, mostly organized through 
Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) serving poorer segments of society. The clients 
or members play the central role; they are the owners of the scheme and are thus re-
sponsible for designing, pricing and underwriting, and for the long-term solvency of 
the insurance. The high degree of involvement of the members in this model has a few 
advantages: (i) multiple forms of information asymmetries that are typical of commer-
cial health insurance can be reduced as readily available local knowledge can be used 
to streamline operational issues and (ii) a high degree of satisfaction with the product 
which is important in a context of voluntary insurance. But, this is conditional on fair 
and transparent management of the scheme, as well as on true and representative inclu-
sion in the design process. The bottleneck of many mutual schemes however is that 
the management usually has little professional expertise in insurance and, the specialist 
knowledge that is necessary needs to be made available from the outside (Radermacher 
& Dror 2006).
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As with every effort of insurance, launching a new CBHI scheme entails collecting and 
analysing the relevant information in order to design and price an insurance package; 
the main items of information in question include willingness-to-pay for health insur-
ance, health status of the target population, its healthcare utilization, healthcare costs 
applying locally, and perceived priorities of the target population. Some information at 
high level can be obtained from official sources, e.g. the Indian National Sample Survey 
Organization (NSSO). However, NSSO data are available only at state level. As seen in 
previous studies  (Dror et al. 2009b, Dror et al. 2008, Dror et al. 2007b, Dror 2007), differ-
ences across locations even within one and the same state can be significant and mate-
rial, and therefore data is needed with much higher density for the purpose of relevant 
calculations for CBHI. The usual practice to collect such local data is to conduct a baseline 
household survey locally (Mwaura & Pongpanich 2012, Doyle et al. 2011, Onwujekwe et 
al. 2010b, De Allegri et al. 2008, Dong et al. 2004, AC Nielsen ORG-MARG Pvt Ltd. 2001). 
However, as a baseline study takes much time and is expensive, some NGOs proceed to 
implement CBHI without adequate data (with the obvious risks involved), and others are 
discouraged from attempting to launch altogether. Neither situation is very desirable. 
1.2 PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the knowledge that can facilitate pre-
implementation activities aimed at upscaling penetration of health insurance among 
rural poor in India by developing a cost- and time-effective methodology to design 
health insurance products contextualized to the local situation. 
The specific research questions addressed in this thesis are: 
1. What are the financial consequences of the current situation, when the target popu-
lation must pay for care out-of-pocket at the point of service delivery?
2. What are the morbidity patterns and healthcare seeking behaviour of the potential 
target population?
3. How can willingness-to-pay (WTP) for health insurance estimates be obtained 
quickly and at low cost?
4. How can relevant and reliable data be obtained for actuarial calculations of health 
insurance package design quickly and at low costs? 
5. How can the preferences of prospective clients regarding the health insurance ben-
efit package be established? 
By answering these research questions, this thesis seeks to contribute to simplifying 
implementation of (community-based) health insurance among the rural poor in India, 
by showing that relevant data can be obtained through newly developed cost- and 
time-effective methodologies. The scientific significance of this thesis resides in the 
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many issues related to health insurance that are analysed from novel angles, and in the 
development of several nonconventional methodologies. 
1.3 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
1.3.1 Short outline 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis describe the situation prevailing among rural poor in 
India with respect to healthcare financing, healthcare needs and healthcare provision. 
This information sets the context for needs analysis of the target population, and for the 
design of the health insurance.  
The second part of this thesis (Chapters 5 till 9) contains a detailed treatment of the 
development of new methodologies to collect or estimate the relevant data for the 
design and pricing of health insurance benefit packages. Specifically, the methods in 
question here relate to obtaining local estimates of WTP, morbidity and healthcare seek-
ing behaviour, cost of healthcare, and perceived priorities for inclusion in insurance.
1.3.2 Financial consequences of OOP expenditures
When health insurance is implemented, the OOP expenditures (or at least part of it) 
are replaced by a premium. A first question that could arise is what is the extent of the 
problem presented by OOP payments in the first place? As OOP expenditures at the 
time and point of healthcare delivery are usually unexpected and the patient thus needs 
to have money at his disposal right away it is also important to investigate how the 
target population finances healthcare expenditures in the absence of health insurance. 
Another issue is that it is usually assumed that inpatient care is the main reason for 
catastrophic health expenditures (Peters et al. 2002), but is that indeed the case also 
in the informal sector and among rural poor? The subject of the second chapter of this 
thesis is the examination of what types of healthcare cause financial hardships. Novel 
criteria are used to analyse patterns of healthcare financing, giving full recognition, for 
the first time, that in addition to direct payments to healthcare providers, other costs, 
e.g. interest on borrowed money or losses due to the involuntary or suboptimal sale 
of (income-generating) assets, cause hardship for the rural poor. The reduction of such 
indirect additional costs could be viewed as a collateral benefit of the health insurance. 
1.3.3 Healthcare needs and provision
In order to design a health insurance benefit package it is necessary to understand 
local healthcare needs and available provision. A lot of attention is given nowadays 
to the epidemiological transition in developing countries (WHO 2011a). Specifically, 
although infectious diseases are still highly present, there is an increasing prevalence of 
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non-communicable diseases (NCDs) as well (WHO 2011b). The assumption is that one 
can observe a double burden of disease (both communicable and non-communicable) 
developing. In chapter 3 of this thesis the prevalence and financial burden of different 
types of NCDs is compared to communicable diseases (CDs), together with the health-
care seeking patterns for the two classes of diseases. 
The fourth chapter deals with the question of the preference of first contact for cura-
tive healthcare among rural communities. In India many different types of providers 
exist (public, private, charitable) practising different types of medicines (allopathic, 
Ayurveda, traditional, etc.). When designing health insurance it is important to know 
which providers the target population usually prefers to approach and why? 
1.3.4 WTP for health insurance
An essential feature of mutual CBHI schemes is that affiliation is voluntary. These schemes 
usually operate without external funding and their expected costs (benefit cost plus ad-
ministrative loading) must equal premium income. In that scenario, the estimate of WTP 
for health insurance determines the width and depth of the benefit package. Therefore 
an estimation of the WTP is the first step in designing the health insurance. 
The target populations of CBHI schemes usually have no or very limited experience 
with health insurance or even insurance in general. In such a context the stated pref-
erence regarding the WTP can be queried during a survey amongst a representative 
sample of the target population using a Contingent Valuation technique. However, 
conducting such a survey takes time and is quite expensive. Also extended explanations 
are required because the target population has difficulty understanding the concept of 
WTP for health insurance and what they might get in return for the premiums. In the 
fifth chapter a new and simple way to obtain an anchor to estimate local WTP for health 
insurance is developed. 
1.3.5 Obtaining relevant and reliable data for the actuarial calculations of health insurance 
benefit packages 
One of the hurdles to launching CBHI schemes is obtaining relevant information needed 
for informed choice when designing and pricing the insurance package. For these ac-
tuarial estimates, information is needed on the probability of healthcare utilized under 
the different insured benefits, and the cost of that utilization. Due to the large regional 
differences and lack of existing data, this information needs to be obtained locally (Dror 
et al. 2009b, Dror et al. 2008, Dror et al. 2007b, Dror 2007). The practice has hitherto been 
to collect this information at the relevant unit through household surveys (Mwaura & 
Pongpanich 2012, Doyle et al. 2011, Onwujekwe et al. 2010b, De Allegri et al. 2008, Dong 
et al. 2004, AC Nielsen ORG-MARG Pvt Ltd. 2001). As already mentioned, the difficulty 
with household surveys is that these are expensive and time consuming exercises. A 
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very important question for the expansion of CBHI is whether it would be possible to 
obtain the same quality of data faster and cheaper. 
In Chapter 6, a novel method to collect information on morbidity and healthcare 
utilization is developed. This novel method is called “Illness Mapping” and is a combined 
variation of two non-interactive consensus group methods (Delphi and Nominal Group 
Technique) operated as an interactive method. Stated differently, a qualitative approach 
is followed to derive quantitative estimates from “experts” in the target community.
The second key parameter, namely cost of healthcare, is discussed in Chapter 7 of 
this thesis. It is recalled that typically, CBHI schemes do not benefit from premium 
subsidy, and must therefore ensure that benefit expenditures would be within the 
limited premium income. The common way to ensure this is through the application 
of a threshold and/or a cap. A threshold is the predetermined amount above which the 
insurance reimburses the rest of the bill. A cap is the predetermined amount up to which 
the insurance reimburses the bill. The consequences of thresholds and/or caps on the 
expected average pay-outs of insurance can only be calculated when the distribution 
of healthcare costs is known. The question now is whether these full distributions of 
costs can be predicted for any location where one wants to implement CBHI based on 
some data points that could be obtained more easily than conducting a full household 
survey? The theoretical model that has been developed to simulate the distribution of 
cost of healthcare benefits, and enable the calculation of consequences of different caps 
and/or thresholds is discussed in chapter 7.  
1.3.6 Revealing benefit package preferences of prospective clients
In the mutual model addressed in this thesis, the clients are the owners of the scheme 
and responsible for all its aspects, including benefit package design. However, how can 
this be accomplished among people that have no experience with insurance and are 
mostly illiterate and innumerate? And, when involved in a difficult process of priority 
setting of health insurance, how judicious are the choices they make? Chapters 8 and 9 
describe a modified version of a tool originally developed and tested in the USA: Choos-
ing Healthplans All Together, CHAT (Goold et al. 2005, Danis et al. 2004, Keefe & Goold 
2004, Danis et al. 2002). CHAT is a simulation group exercise of choosing health insur-
ance benefits under a limited budget, designed to make complex decisions more simple 
and familiar by incorporating complicated data such as actuarial costs into a simplified 
exercise board. The modified version is tailored to the reality of India and takes into 
account the illiteracy and innumeracy of the target population. Both chapters describe 
evidence of experiments during which the target groups made choices, and in chapter 
9 it is analysed how judicious those choices were in terms of the actual expenditure 
patterns. 

Chapter 2
Hardship financing of healthcare among 
rural poor in Odisha, India
Based on:  Binnendijk, E., Koren, R., Dror, D.M. 
Hardship financing of healthcare among rural poor in Odisha, India. 
BMC Health Services Research 2012, 12:23.
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ABSTRACT
Objective This study examines health-related “hardship financing” in order to get bet-
ter insights on how poor households finance their out-of-pocket healthcare costs. We 
define hardship financing as having to borrow money with interest or to sell assets to 
pay out-of-pocket healthcare costs. Methods Using survey data of 5,383 low-income 
households in Odisha, one of the poorest states of India, we investigate factors influenc-
ing the risk of hardship financing with the use of a logistic regression. Results Overall, 
about 25% of the households (that had any healthcare cost) reported hardship financing 
during the year preceding the survey. Among households that experienced a hospital-
ization, this percentage was nearly 40%, but even among households with outpatient or 
maternity-related care around 25% experienced hardship financing. Hardship financing 
is explained not merely by the wealth of the household (measured by assets) or how 
much is spent out-of-pocket on healthcare costs, but also by when the payment occurs, 
its frequency and its duration (e.g. more severe in cases of chronic illnesses). The location 
where a household resides remains a major predictor of the likelihood to have hardship 
financing despite all other household features included in the model. Conclusions Rural 
poor households are subjected to considerable and protracted financial hardship due 
to the indirect and longer-term deleterious effects of how they cope with out-of-pocket 
healthcare costs. The social network that households can access influences exposure 
to hardship financing. Our findings point to the need to develop a policy solution that 
would limit that exposure both in quantum and in time. We therefore conclude that 
policy interventions aiming to ensure health-related financial protection would have to 
demonstrate that they have reduced the frequency and the volume of hardship financ-
ing.
Hardship financing of healthcare
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2.1 BACKGROUND
While we know that the biggest part of health expenditures in India is paid by health-
seekers themselves when getting care, we know much less about how those costs 
are met. Evidence confirms that out-of-pocket spending on healthcare absorb more 
than one quarter of household resources net of food costs in at least one-tenth of all 
households in India (Van Doorslaer et al. 2005). All over India, the level of out-of-pocket 
spending is 69.5% of total health expenditures (GOI 2009). This considerable burden 
warrants a better understanding of how poor households finance these out-of-pocket 
healthcare costs. This article focuses on this very question, using data from Odisha, 
where out-of-pocket spending represents nearly 80% of health expenditure (GOI 2009). 
The literature dealing with financing of out-of-pocket healthcare cost includes defini-
tions of “catastrophic” healthcare expenditures when spending exceeds an essentially 
arbitrary threshold. Xu et al. (2003) fix the threshold at 40% of disposable income net 
of subsistence needs; Russell (2004) and Van Doorslaer et al. (2005) use a threshold of 
10% of total annual household income. However, these methods fail to recognize that 
a uniform threshold might represent varying levels of hardship. For example, spending 
10% by a poor household could mean withdrawing a child from school or skipping a 
meal, while the same spending level would not entail any immediate consequence for 
a richer household (Kruk et al. 2009, Wagstaff 2008). Also the timing of the payment 
could cause different cash-flow problems. As most rural poor households in India have 
irregular flows of income, they would find it easier to pay during harvest season (when 
they have income from selling the crop or from work as agricultural labourers) than in 
other times of the year. Morduch and Rutherford (2003) reported this cash-flow pattern 
to hold true in most low-income countries.
We therefore assess the hardship a household faces as a consequence of health ex-
penses not merely by the amount spent, but by the additional costs to the direct cost 
of healthcare related to how the out-of-pocket spending is financed. This is in line with 
notions put forward by Flores et al. (2008) and Kruk et al. (2009). 
Three sources of financing out-of-pocket healthcare costs can be distinguished: pay-
ing from current income or savings; borrowing with zero interest (e.g. from family and 
friends), and borrowing with interest or selling assets. The first two categories may be re-
garded as less burdensome than the third (Asfaw et al. 2010, Kruk et al. 2009, Steinhardt 
et al. 2009), because selling assets or borrowing money with interest usually entails a 
cost. This cost is self-explanatory in the case of interest on loans (Krishna 2004). Selling 
assets also generates costs, such as losses when assets are sold at less than optimal price, 
or future income loss due to the sale of income-generating assets (like land or livestock). 
Thus, we say that households incur “hardship financing” when they are exposed to a 
less stable or worsened financial state brought about by additional costs/losses due to 
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borrowing or selling assets. This definition follows Kruk et al. (2009), with the notable 
modification that we only consider borrowing with interest instead of any borrowing. 
Our adjustment is in agreement with previous findings (Kochar 1997) and with our in-
vestigations that confirmed that borrowing from family/friends for healthcare purposes 
is indeed mostly interest-free.
Many of the previous publications regarding the financing sources for out-of-pocket 
payments for healthcare in developing countries, and in India, are related to financing 
of care for specific diseases (Adhikari et al. 2009, Khun & Manderson 2008, Russell 2004, 
Van Damme et al. 2004, Wyss et al. 2004, Mock et al. 2003, Nahar & Costello 1998, Sauer-
born et al. 1996) and mostly based on small-scale surveys. Some studies look at specific 
population segments (Asfaw et al. 2010, Bonu et al. 2005), others used data available on 
a whole country level (Kruk et al. 2009, Steinhardt et al. 2009, Flores et al. 2008, Leive & 
Xu 2008). Kruk et al. (2009), whom we follow in the definition of “hardship financing”, 
looked at nationally representative household surveys of 40 low- and middle-income 
countries, whereas we look at rural (and largely tribal) poor in three districts of Odisha, 
one of the poorest states in India. By focusing on this target population, we examine 
hardship financing of out-of-pocket payments for healthcare expenditures among the 
most vulnerable segment of society in India. Our goal is to identify the parameters af-
fecting households’ risk to resort to hardship financing. 
2.2 DATA AND METHODS
2.2.1 Setting and sampling
We used data from a household survey undertaken early in 2009 in the rural areas of 
Kalahandi, Khorda, and Malkangiri districts of the state of Odisha. Odisha, the eleventh 
largest state of India by population (41,947,358) with 83% of population being rural 
(GOI 2011b, GOI 2011a), is located on the Bay of Bengal at the east coast of India. The 
average monthly per capita consumer expenditure (MPCE) of INR 459 (PPP$ 30.6) for 
rural Odisha, is the lowest of all states (NSSO 2008). The household survey questionnaire 
was translated into Oriya (the local language), back translated for verification, and pre-
tested among 80 households in the area. Surveyors who spoke local dialects fluently 
conducted the survey. 
We followed a three-stage sampling procedure. (i) The sites in Odisha were selected 
due to a relationship with 11 NGOs1 that invited the research team to conduct a baseline 
1. The 11 grassroots NGOs linked with Madhyam Foundation, Bhubaneswar, Odisha included: (i) in 
Malkangiri: Parivartan, PUSPAC, SOMKS, SDS, ODC; (ii) in Kalahandi: Mahashakti Foundation, DAPTA, Lok 
Yojana, Sanginee; and (iii) in Khorda MVPS, DSS.
Hardship financing of healthcare
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study (prior to launching a development project among their members). (ii) Within each 
district, villages were selected randomly from among those selected by the NGOs for the 
development project (27 villages in Kalahandi, 22 in Khorda, 31 in Malkangiri). (iii) Stage 
three entailed random sampling of two equal sub-cohorts in each village: ‘member 
households’ and ‘non-member households’ (comparator group). Member households 
(i.e. households that included at least one person who was a member of a Self-Help 
Group (SHG2) linked to one of the respective NGOs) were selected randomly out of the 
membership list. Non-member households were sampled randomly with the use of line 
sampling (from the centre of the village 4 lines were drawn in the four winds directions, 
“the four winds technique”) (Som 1996).We interviewed a total of 5,383 households 
representing 25,606 individuals (with a similar number of member and non-member 
households in every village, totalling 2,688 member and 2,695 non-member households 
and with a similar number of households from each district, totalling 1820 households 
from Kalahandi, 1763 households from Khorda and 1800 households from Malkangiri). 
100% of the sample interviewed was rural. 
At the time of the rollout of the survey there was no local ethics committee in place 
in Odisha, India. We however held a two-day workshop in preparation of the study in 
which we discussed the ethical aspects of the study with scholars and senior scholars 
from India. Informed consent of the respondents was obtained at the beginning of the 
interviews and we kept participants’ names confidential in data recording and analysis. 
2.2.2 Data
The household survey questionnaire included questions on socioeconomic status: 
education of household head, occupation of household head, source of drinking water, 
toilet facility and caste. Under the Constitution of India, the government has “scheduled” 
certain backward Indian classes or groups [hence Scheduled Castes (GOI 1950a) or 
Scheduled Tribes (GOI 1950b), and “Other backward castes”], with the view to promoting 
their welfare. Scheduled Tribes (Tribals or Adivasis) are mostly not Hindu and thus out of 
the caste system and are considered the most disadvantaged economically. Scheduled 
Castes (Dalits and those sometimes labelled “Untouchable”) are considered at the bot-
tom of caste hierarchy. The list of Other Backward Castes is quite dynamic and changes 
from time to time in many states. All other castes are described here as General Caste. 
For household income, we followed the method adopted by the Indian National 
Sample Survey Organization to obtain a proxy (monthly per capita consumer expen-
diture) through questions on many items of household expenditure (expenditures on 
2. SHGs represent a unique approach to financial intermediation in communities. The approach com-
bines access to low-cost financial services with a process of self-management and development for the 
SHG members. SHGs are seen to confer many benefits, both economic and social.
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food, clothing, fuel, etc.) (NSSO 2008). In our study, unlike the National Sample Survey 
Organization, we did not include health expenditure, because we seek to identify pat-
terns of financing of healthcare (Wagstaff 2008, Flores et al. 2008). We label this proxy for 
socioeconomic status as “income-proxy”. 
We also developed an asset-index as proxy for socioeconomic status by performing a 
principal component analysis (PCA) on various aspects of household assets, following 
the guidelines of Vyas and Kumaranayake (Vyas & Kumaranayake 2006). PCA is a statisti-
cal technique used for data reduction. We included the following variables: house type, 
source of lighting, way of cooking, land ownership, various consumer durables (radio, 
motor cycle, telephone, etc.), possession of animals (cattle, sheep, chickens, etc.). Size 
of land and possession of animals were included as continuous variables, the other vari-
ables as binary (yes/no) variables. We then used the factor scores of each of the variables 
from the first principal component as weights and computed a total for each household: 
the household’s socioeconomic score. Characteristic of this score is that it has a mean 
equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to one; the higher the score, the higher the 
implied socioeconomic status or wealth of that household. As we deal in this paper with 
health-related issues, source of drinking water and toilet facility were not included in the 
PCA given their possible direct relation with health status (Vyas & Kumaranayake 2006, 
Dunteman & Lewis-Beck 1989). 
Besides indicators of socioeconomic status, the household survey questionnaire 
included questions on healthcare utilization and cost. The households were asked 
whether they had incurred expenditures for outpatient care, hospital admittances and 
maternity-related care in the year preceding the survey. Hospital admittances reflected 
cases with inpatient stay exceeding 24 hours. Stays in hospital of less than 24 hours were 
counted under outpatient care, together with consultations with a healthcare practi-
tioner, and payment for medicines or tests in an outpatient setting. Maternity-related 
utilization included delivery and pre- and post-natal care. Respondents were asked to 
estimate total direct medical expenditures of the household in the year preceding the 
survey, as well as the expenditures for hospital admittances in the household in the 
year preceding the survey. More detailed information on outpatient care utilization and 
cost was queried for one month preceding the survey. Chronic illness in the household 
was identified by a set of questions related to symptoms, length of illness and regular 
medicine use. 
We asked households also what hospital they would go to in case of a hospitalization 
of more than 24 hours, what kind of hospital this is, and the distance (travel time in 
minutes) to this hospital. Similar questions were asked related to the practitioner for 
outpatient care. 
Households that reported healthcare costs for hospitalizations, outpatient care, 
or maternity-related care during the year preceding the survey were asked how they 
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financed each type of these cost. Sources of financing included using current income, 
money received as gift, savings, money obtained from selling assets, money obtained 
through borrowing (borrowing options included relatives, friends/neighbours, bank, 
moneylender, or microfinance e.g. local microfinance institution or SHG), health insur-
ance, and other sources. Households could report as many sources of financing as 
relevant. With respect to borrowing we also queried how much was borrowed from each 
of these sources to pay for healthcare costs. In this paper we ignore three sources since 
they turned out to be negligible (e.g. 1.4% of households with any health expenditure 
reported gifts, 0.02% reported health insurance and 0.7% reported “other”). 
We categorized a combination of financing sources as hardship financing: selling as-
sets or borrowing money with interest from bank, microfinance or moneylender. If a 
household had reported using at least one of these financing sources, this household 
was categorized as having had hardship financing. Households that reported using only 
current income and/or savings and/or borrowing from relatives or friends/neighbours 
were defined as having had no hardship financing.
2.2.3 Analysis
We investigated factors influencing the risk of households to need hardship financing 
when paying for healthcare costs with the use of a multivariate analysis. We applied 
a logistic regression (logit model) as the outcome variable is a binary variable (yes/no 
hardship financing). Only households that had healthcare costs in the year preceding 
the survey were included in the regression. The explanatory variables were included in 
the model in a stepwise inclusion procedure. 
Data is analysed using STATA version 11. The unit of analysis is the household, reflect-
ing the fact that in rural low-income countries, many decisions on paying for healthcare 
are taken at that level rather than by individuals (Sauerborn et al. 1995).
Statistical significance of difference has been shown at levels of 10%, 5% and 0.1% 
throughout the paper. When ANOVA is used we show significance with *, ** and *** 
respectively; when Pearson Chi-square is used we show significance with†, †† and††† 
respectively. In case of the logistic regression statistical significance of the coefficient 
(Z-test) is shown at levels of 5%, 1% and 0.1% with *, ** and *** respectively.
All amounts, reported in Indian Rupee (INR) during the survey, were converted into 
international dollars (Purchasing Power Parity, PPP$) using the exchange rate of PPP$ 1 
= INR 16.389 for 2009 (IMF 2011). 
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2.3 RESULTS
2.3.1 Socio-economic profile
The socioeconomic profile of the sampled population is summarized in Table 2.1. The 
majority of the studied population is from Scheduled Caste or Tribe. The majority of the 
household heads have no or very little education and work as daily wage labourers or 
are self-employed in agriculture. The income of our sampled population in Odisha was 
on average below the extreme poverty anchor of PPP$ 1.08 per person and day (defined 
by the World Bank in 1993, equalling PPP$ 1.71 p.p.p.d. when adjusted to the survey year 
2009 and to India) (Sillers 2005, OECD statistics ). Most households have no toilet and 
get drinking water from a shared tap in the village or hand pump/well. The households 
consist on average of 4.8 persons of which 8% are infants (0-4 years old) and 8% are 
elderly (60 years and older). 
The socioeconomic status indicators from the National Sample Survey Organization 
for rural Odisha show similar patterns as our aggregated total population (table 2.1): 
income-proxy PPP$ 28.9 p.p.p.m., household size 4.6 persons) (NSSO 2008).
2.3.2 Morbidity, healthcare availability, utilization and cost
Information on morbidity, availability of healthcare, utilization of healthcare and health-
care expenditures of the sampled population are summarized in Table 2.2. 
Around 85% of the sampled households had health expenditures in the year preced-
ing the survey, and almost 24% of households had to meet hospitalization costs in the 
same period. Around 10% of the sampled households have a chronically ill person in the 
household.
Average health expenditures represented about 9% of the average income-proxy 
for the sampled population (income-proxy p.p.p.m. and household size table 2.1, total 
health expenditure for the household last year table 2.2). 
Households usually go to a public facility for hospitalizations of more than 24 hours. In 
about half of the cases they go to a public facility for outpatient care. To go to the facility 
where they would go to for a hospitalization takes a little bit more than 50 minutes travel 
time; the facility for outpatient care is on average 30 minutes away from their homes. 
In Appendix 2.1 and 2.2 the same information of Table 2.1 and 2.2 is shown separate 
for the member and non-member sub-cohorts (defined in the methods section). The dif-
ference between SHG members and non-members in morbidity, healthcare utilization 
and cost is not significant for most indicators. The difference in socioeconomic profile 
between the member and non-member cohorts seems to be significant, pointing to 
a higher socioeconomic status for SHG members. However, for the indicators that are 
significantly different, this difference is rather small and probably immaterial. Therefore 
Hardship financing of healthcare
25
Table 2.1 Demographics & socioeconomic status
Mean (±SEa)
Income-proxy p.p.p.m. (PPP$)b 32.41 (±0.29)
Asset-indexc 0.00 (±0.03)
Household size 4.76 (±0.02)
Ratio infants (0-4) in household 0.082 (±0.002)
Ratio elderly (60 and older) in household 0.075 (±0.002)
% of total
Casted 
 Scheduled Tribe 30.0%
 Scheduled Caste 22.3%
 Other Backward Caste 31.3%
 General Caste 16.5%
Education level household head  
 No education 51.4%
 Class 1-5 22.2%
 Class 6-10 23.8%
 Class 11 and higher 2.7%
Occupation household head  
 Self-employed agriculture 38.7%
 Self-employed business/trade 16.1%
 Regular Salaried employee 4.6%
 Daily wage labourer 30.8%
 Not working 9.9%
Source of drinking water  
 Own tap 9.9%
 Shared tap 53.9%
 Hand-pump/well 36.2%
Toilet facility  
 Own flush toilet 4.4%
 Own pit toilet 4.9%
 Shared toilet 1.0%
 No toilet 89.7%
a SE = Standard Error.
b Income is proxied as monthly per capita consumer expenditure through questions on many items of 
household expenditure and expressed in Purchasing Power Parity International Dollar. 
c Asset-index is a proxy for socioeconomic status based on various aspects of household assets. The index 
is calculated using a principal component analysis (PCA).
d Caste is a proxy for socioeconomic status in India. Scheduled Castes (Dalits and those sometimes 
labelled “untouchable”) are considered at the bottom of caste hierarchy. The list of Other Backward Castes 
is quite dynamic and changes from time to time in many states. All other castes are described here as 
General Caste.
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we aggregated the two sub-cohorts for the descriptive statistics, but included the mem-
bership variable in the regression analysis. 
2.3.3 Healthcare financing
We asked respondents how they financed their healthcare costs (Figure 2.1). The major-
ity of the households reported to have used at least (some) of their current income and 
savings to pay for their health expenditures. However, the multiplicity of sources shows 
that households were often unable to fund all their health expenditures from their cur-
rent income and savings alone.
Households selling assets or borrowing money with interest in order to finance 
their healthcare were defined as households with hardship financing. Households that 
were able to finance their healthcare costs solely from current income, savings and/or 
borrowing without interest (from relatives or friends/neighbours) are defined as house-
Table 2.2 Morbidity, healthcare availability, utilization and cost in the sampled population
Mean (±SEa)
Total health expenditure last year for household (PPP$)b 167.34 (±5.14)
Distance to preferred hospital (in minutes) 52.48 (±0.54)
Distance to preferred primary care practitioner (in minutes) 30.40 (±0.40)
% of total
Household with chronic ill person 10.5%
Household with hospitalization costs last year 23.5%
Household with outpatient care costs last year 83.8%
Household with maternity costs last year 14.4%
Household with any healthcare costs last year 85.1%
Hospital household usually goes to
 Private 6.3%
 Public 93.7%
Preferred primary care practitioner household usually goes to
 Traditional healer 36.6%
 Government facility 50.4%
 Unqualified private doctor (non-MBBS)c 7.6%
 AYUSH practitionerd 3.2%
 Qualified private doctor/specialist (MBBS) 2.2%
a SE = Standard Error.
b Total health expenditure last year for household expressed in Purchasing Power Parity International 
Dollar.
c Unqualified private doctor (non-MBBS) is a doctor practicing allopathic medicine without having a 
medical degree (Medical Bachelor and Bachelor of Surgery).
d AYUSH is the aggregate of all qualified systems of traditional medicines in India: Ayurveda, Yoga and 
Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homeopathy. 
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holds with no hardship financing. Figure 2.2 shows the shares of households paying 
healthcare costs with hardship financing versus households that did not have to use 
hardship financing. 
Overall, about 25% of the households (with any healthcare cost) had hardship financ-
ing during the year preceding the survey. Among households that experienced a hos-
pitalization this percentage is much higher, nearly 40% had hardship financing. Quite 
unexpectedly, 23% of household that incurred outpatient costs also reported that they 
had to use hardship financing sources to pay for this outpatient care, as well as 25% of 
the households that had a maternity case in the reference period. 
2.3.4 Parameters influencing the risk of hardship financing
We explored with the use of a logistic regression the factors that could influence the risk 
of households to need hardship financing when paying for healthcare costs (Table 2.3).
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Socioeconomic and demographic parameters
We found that, whereas the logarithm of the income-proxy was not a significant predic-
tor of hardship financing, the asset-index was a highly significant and negative predictor 
(i.e. households with a lower asset-index have a higher propensity to have hardship fi-
nancing). The education of the household head did not influence the probability to have 
hardship financing while his occupation did; households where the household head is 
self-employed in agriculture, self-employed in business, a daily wage labourer, or does 
not work due to any reason all have a significant higher likelihood to have hardship 
financing than households where the household head is a regular salaried employee. 
Caste, household size, the ratio of infants or the ratio of elderly in the household did not 
have a significant impact on hardship financing.
The minority (10%) of households with a better source of water are less likely to have 
hardship financing. The type of toilet used was not a significant explanatory variable. 
Morbidity parameters & health expenditures
The logarithm of the total health expenditures during the year preceding the survey is a 
significant and positive predictor of hardship financing. Interestingly, having a chronically 
ill person in the household, or having experienced one or more events of hospitalization in 
the year preceding the survey are both significant independent predictors even after the 
overall health expenditures has been taken into account in the regression analysis. 
2.3.5 Impact of SHG membership on hardship financing
The logistic regression (table 2.3) revealed that households where someone is a member 
of an SHG have a higher propensity to have hardship financing. This we found somewhat 
unexpected as we did not observe a big difference between the member and non-
member sub-cohorts in demographics, socioeconomic status, morbidity, healthcare 
utilization and costs. Also the direction of the influence is somewhat unexpected. When 
looking at the demographics, SHG member households have a slightly higher asset-
index, have more household heads that are salaried employees and more often have 
their own tap than non-member households (i.e. less poor households). And, from the 
logistic regression (table 2.3) it can be seen that, as expected, less poor households are 
less likely to have hardship financing. But, when controlled for these variables in the 
regression itself, it seems that SHG members are more likely to have hardship financing. 
When looking at the financing sources used by members and non-members, we found that 
SHG members rely significantly more often on microfinance as a source of borrowing than 
non-members when paying for all health expenditures, hospital expenditures, or outpatient 
expenditures (4.4% vs. 2.3%, p < .001; 8.5% vs. 4.7%, p < 0.01; 3.7% vs. 2.1%, p < .01 respec-
tively, Chi2). Non-members on the other hand make more frequently use of their savings in 
order to pay for hospital expenditures than members (23.8% vs. 17.0%, p < .01, Chi2). 
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Table 2.3 Factors that influence the risk of hardship financing for households with healthcare costs 
(logistic regression)
Coefficient 95% Confidence interval
Socioeconomic and demographic parameters
Log income-proxya 0.1197 -0.0694 0.3089
Asset-indexb -0.1176 *** -0.1698 -0.0655
Employment household head
Salaried employee Reference
Self-employed in agriculture 0.8420 ** 0.3307 1.3533
Self-employed in business/trade 0.7521 ** 0.2176 1.2866
Daily wage labourer 0.9204 ** 0.4005 1.4404
Not working 0.7824 ** 0.2145 1.3503
Education household head
No education Reference
Class 1-5 -0.0831 -0.2991 0.1329
Class 6-10 -0.1719 -0.3930 0.0492
Class 11 and higher -0.0340 -0.6023 0.5343
Castec
Scheduled Caste -0.1293 -0.4347 0.1761
Scheduled Tribe 0.2173 -0.0632 0.4978
Other Backward Caste -0.1570 -0.4255 0.1116
General Caste Reference
Household size 0.0370 -0.0135 0.0876
Ratio infants (0-4) in household 0.2015 -0.4490 0.8520
Ratio elderly (60+) in household 0.1851 -0.3583 0.7284
Source of water
Own tap Reference
Shared tap 0.4873 ** 0.1733 0.8013
Hand pump / Well 0.3540 * 0.0286 0.6794
Type of toilet
Own flush toilet Reference
Own pit toilet 0.0556 -0.5192 0.6305
Shared toilet 0.7037 -0.2623 1.6697
No toilet -0.0607 -0.4942 0.3728
Morbidity parameters and health expenditures
Log health expenditures last year 0.7232 *** 0.6365 0.8099
Chronic illness in household 
No chronic ill Reference
Chronic ill 0.3779 ** 0.1301 0.6257
Hospitalization in household last year
No hospitalization Reference
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2.3.6 Impact of location on hardship financing
When controlled for all features of individual households as variables included in the 
logistic regression, still the district in which a household resides remains a major predic-
tor of the likelihood to have hardship financing (table 2.3). Therefore we explored this 
further. Figure 2.3 shows the difference in hardship financing between the districts. 
By using a step-by-step inclusion procedure for the different variables in the regres-
sion, we found that the healthcare costs explained the difference in hardship financing 
between households in Malkangiri and Khorda districts. No other variable had this ef-
fect. The difference between Kalahandi on the one hand and Khorda and Malkangiri on 
the other hand remained unexplained with the current set of variables. 
Table 2.3 (Continued)
Coefficient 95% Confidence interval
Hospitalization 0.7225 *** 0.5335 0.9116
SHG membership in household
No SHG member Reference
SHG memberd 0.2184 ** 0.0536 0.3833
Location of residence
Khorda district Reference
Kalahandi district 1.3776 *** 1.1376 1.6176
Malkangiri district 0.1739 -0.0947 0.4424
Constant -9.5496 *** -11.1226 -7.9766
N 4121
Likelihood ratio test: 
LR chi2(27) 1025.76
Prob > chi2 0.00
Pearson goodness-of-fit test: 
Pearson chi2(4091) 3930.87
Prob > chi2 0.96
* Significance of coefficient p<0.05 (Z-test)
** Significance of coefficient p<0.01 (Z-test)
*** Significance of coefficient p<0.001 (Z-test)
a Income is proxied as monthly per capita consumer expenditure through questions on many items of 
household expenditure and expressed in Purchasing Power Parity International Dollar. 
b Asset-index is a proxy for socioeconomic status based on various aspects of household assets. The index 
is calculated using a principal component analysis (PCA).
c Caste is a proxy for socioeconomic status in India. Scheduled Castes (Dalits and those sometimes 
labelled “untouchable”) are considered at the bottom of caste hierarchy. The list of Other Backward Castes 
is quite dynamic and changes from time to time in many states. All other castes are described here as 
General Caste.
d A household was defined as SHG member if at least one person in the household was a member of a 
Self-Help Group (SHG) linked to one of the related NGOs.
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In the course of the examination we also checked other variables (e.g. preferred 
type of hospital, preferred practitioner for outpatient care, and distance (in minutes 
of travel time) to both preferred hospital and preferred outpatient practitioner) which 
were eliminated from the model as they did not proof to be statistically significant and 
weakened the overall model. 
In order to find an explanation for the difference across the districts, we looked at 
alternative morbidity-related parameters. From our household survey we also have in-
formation on illness episodes and related costs for last month that cannot be annualized 
at the level of the single household. Therefore these parameters can serve to estimate 
morbidity of the district, but cannot be included in the regression analysis (Table 2.4). 
In both Kalahandi and Khorda around 62% of the households reported an illness 
last month and around 60% had outpatient treatment (in the form of consultation, 
medicines and/or tests) for that illness. In Malkangiri this percentage is lower: 51% of 
the households reported an illness last month and 49% had some form of outpatient 
treatment for that illness. The average cost of the outpatient treatment is the highest in 
Khorda (PPP$ 71.74), a bit lower in Kalahandi (PPP$ 56.65) and much lower in Malkangiri 
(PPP$ 34.78). 
Although the parameters of the socioeconomic status of individual households were 
included in the regression, we wondered whether the average socioeconomic status 
of the district is associated with the risk of hardship financing. Therefore we also show 
the average socioeconomic status (income-proxy and asset-index) for each of the three 
districts in table 2.4. We found that the sampled population in Khorda is on average 
wealthier than the other two districts which are similar to each other.
Finally we examined whether the access of households to a social network of family 
and/or friends that can provide interest-free loans is different in the three districts. We 
checked this through the share of households with health expenditures that borrowed 
from family and/or friends (table 2.4). We found that households in Khorda had a bet-
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Figure 2.3 Hardship financing in the three districts
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ter access to such a social network than households in Kalahandi and Malkangiri. It is 
interesting to note that a higher average asset-index is positively associated with higher 
interest-free borrowing from family/friends. 
2.4 DISCUSSION
In this study we found that many households experienced hardship financing. We de-
fined hardship financing as being exposed to a less stable or worsened financial state 
brought about by additional costs/losses due to borrowing or selling assets. Based on 
the information in our household survey we cannot quantify losses due to selling as-
sets. However, using the amounts borrowed from different sources as reported in our 
household survey and assuming a standard period of 12 months for all loans, an equal 
monthly repayment regime, and the following interest rates per annum (48% - money-
lenders, 24% - microfinance 12.5% - banks (Basu 2006, Kochar 1997)), we can estimate 
the additional cost of the interest payment on the loans. Households that borrowed with 
Table 2.4 Additional explanatory variables across the three districts
Parameter Kalahandi Khorda Malkangiri
% of sampled household that reported 
illness last month
62.3% 61.6% 51.3% ††† d
% of sampled household that had 
outpatient treatment last month
60.7% 59.8% 49.1% ††† d
Outpatient cost of household that 
reported illness last month (±SE) (PPP$)a
56.65 (±2.21) 71.74 (±3.39)  34.78 (±1.77)   *** e
Income-proxy p.p.p.m. (±SE) (PPP$)b 29.94 (±0.48) 36.16 (±0.54)  31.35 (±0.46)   ***
Asset-index (±SE)c -0.70 (±0.04)  1.36 (±0.06)   -0.62 (±0.05)   *** f
% of household with healthcare 
expenditures that reported borrowing 
from relatives and/or friends
15.6% 23.7% 14.2% ††† g
*** Significance of overall difference across the three districts p<0.001 (ANOVA)
††† Significance of overall difference across the three districts p<0.001 (Pearson Chi-square)
a Average outpatient costs ± Standard Error, expressed in Purchasing Power Parity International Dollar. 
b Income is proxied as monthly per capita consumer expenditure through questions on many items of 
household expenditure and expressed in Purchasing Power Parity International Dollar. SE = Standard 
Error.
c Asset-index is a proxy for socioeconomic status based on various aspects of household assets. The index 
is calculated using a principal component analysis (PCA). SE = Standard Error.
d The difference between Kalahandi and Khorda is not significant for both indicators, p=.687 and p=.593 
respectively Chi2
e For each of the three districts the average cost is significantly different from any other district, p<.001 
ANOVA
f The difference in average asset-index between Kalahandi and Malkangiri is not significant (p=.163 
ANOVA)
g The difference in share between Kalahandi and Malkangiri is not significant, p=.282 Chi2
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interest from a bank, moneylender or microfinance paid, under the above assumptions, 
a mean interest amount of PPP$ 64. This adds almost 24% to their healthcare costs, and 
represents on average nearly 5% of overall annual household expenditure excluding 
health expenditure. Unlike common economic theory that borrowing or selling assets 
would have immediate welfare in the sense that the ill person could be treated, that 
welfare gain comes at a cost of welfare loss that extends over a much longer period 
of time. The added welfare comes at varying prices, which reflects not the value of the 
additional consumption (in this case the cost of care) but the varying cost of financ-
ing, which is more expensive for those that resort to moneylenders than those that can 
resort to cheaper sources of borrowing or do not have to borrow at all.
Hardship financing occurs not only when facing the high cost of inpatient care (nearly 
40%) but also outpatient care (23%). This finding is in line with a previous study where 
it was found that the aggregated costs of outpatient care can exceed those of inpatient 
care among low-income households in India (Dror et al. 2008). Interestingly our results 
reveal that maternity-related expenditures also cause hardship financing for a quarter 
of the households, although these events are known in advance and theoretically the 
household could save money and prepare for them. When considering the entire target 
population, the impact of hardship financing of outpatient care can be considered more 
severe than of inpatient care since 84% of the sampled households reported expenses 
due to outpatient care and only 24% had expenses due to inpatient care. Berman et al. 
(2010) have reached a similar conclusion using a different methodology. These authors 
compared the number of households below poverty line before and after healthcare 
payment as a definition of impoverishment and found that outpatient care was more 
impoverishing than inpatient care for households in India. 
Peters (2002) reported that 40% of hospitalized patients (all-India average) had to sell 
assets or borrow money to pay for hospital costs. Duggal (2004) found that among the 
poorest quintile in India, this percentage was 50%. One would expect our result for the 
rural poor communities of Odisha to be similar to the percentage found for the lowest 
quintile. The discrepancy however could be due to the difference in definition, as we 
considered as hardship financing only borrowing with interest. According to these and 
other results (Kruk et al. 2009) it is reasonable to assume that poorer households have 
a higher risk to experience hardship financing. We wondered whether this difference 
still holds within our study-population, all of which is poor. We addressed this issue in 
our multivariate logistic regression by including two measures for wealth (income-proxy 
and asset-index). Interestingly we found that whereas a lower asset-index was associ-
ated with a higher risk of hardship financing, the association with income-proxy was 
not significant. This may well reflect the situation that in the informal economy many 
transactions are not monetized and the possession of assets is a more reliable indica-
tor of socioeconomic status (Moser & Felton 2007). The negative association between 
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asset-index and hardship financing could be due to asset-rich households for instance 
having a better chance of accessing social networks that would be more likely to give 
interest-free loans (non-hardship financing). It cannot be excluded though that the 
lower asset-index may be a result of, rather than the cause for, hardship financing, as we 
measure the asset-index after the health event. 
Households where the household head is a salaried employee were least likely to 
need hardship financing compared to households where the head was self-employed 
in business or in agriculture, was a daily-wage labourer or did not work. As income was 
included in the regression as a separate parameter, the reason for the correlation with 
employment cannot be attributed solely to a difference in income. Perhaps the differ-
ence is due to having a steady rather than erratic flow of income. This finding would then 
be in agreement with our hypothesis that hardship financing can sometimes be caused 
by a time gap between the inflow of income and outflow of health expenses. 
From our logistic regression it turned out, as could be intuitively expected, that health 
expenditures in the last year were significantly associated with the risk for hardship 
financing. However, interestingly, having had a chronic illness or hospitalization in the 
household in the last year were also independent significant indicators for hardship 
financing. This means that the presence of chronic illness or hospitalization affected the 
risk of hardship financing in a way which was independent of the related expenses. Both 
chronic illness and hospitalization generate many indirect costs (loss of income of the 
chronic ill patient, loss of income of the hospitalized patient and/or caretaker and trans-
portation costs) which could independently aggravate the situation leading to hardship 
financing. The recurring nature of outpatient expenditures related to a chronic illness 
could cause depletion of savings and attrition of goodwill of others to give interest-free 
loans and thus increase the need for hardship financing. In the case of hospitalizations 
one should note that poor households usually have to pay (some) costs upfront before 
admission to or treatment in hospital (Duggal 2004). Therefore the unpredictable timing 
of hospital care and immediate need for large funds associated with such an event could 
increase the risk of hardship financing. 
SHG membership surprisingly reported increased likelihood to have hardship financ-
ing, even though we have seen that SHG members are slightly better off than non-
members (Appendix 2.1) and that better off households need less hardship financing. 
The explanation for this phenomenon might be that members have their savings tied up 
in the scheme and can therefore not liquefy those savings when needed. On the other 
hand, SHG members have an easier access to low-interest loans while non-members 
cannot easily access microfinance and low-interest loans. Therefore it is possible that 
SHG members would prefer this low-interest loan over borrowing from relatives/friends 
who may not be able to spare the money for a long time. 
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Finally it becomes very clear from the regression that the difference in hardship fi-
nancing across the three districts could not be fully explained by the many household 
features included in the model. We found that the district where the household resides 
has a big significant independent effect on the risk of hardship financing. Using the step-
wise regression method we found that when healthcare costs are introduced into the 
model, the difference in the risk of hardship financing between Malkangiri and Khorda 
became insignificant. The difference in hardship financing between Kalahandi on the 
one hand and Khorda and Malkangiri on the other hand remained unexplained with the 
current set of variables: living in Kalahandi could be associated with increased likelihood 
of hardship financing, because of higher utilization and costs of outpatient care com-
pared to Malkangiri. In Khorda, both utilization and costs of outpatient care were similar 
to those observed in Kalahandi, yet the risk of hardship financing was significantly lower. 
This could be linked to the related finding that average income-proxy and asset-index 
in Khorda are higher than in Kalahandi (the asset index introduced in the regression 
takes into account the wealth of the individual household but the average asset index in 
the district reflects the wealth of the social network). This difference could suggest that 
households in Khorda have access to richer family/friends (better social network) that 
can provide more interest-free loans. This assumption gains credibility from the find-
ing that a higher percentage of households in Khorda borrowed from relatives/friends, 
compared to Kalahandi (table 2.4). 
While this study can play an important role in advancing the notion of hardship financ-
ing as a measure of the effectiveness of health financing policy alternative to the cata-
strophic spending method, there are some limitations to this study. Without adequate 
data one cannot conclude that the same findings would apply elsewhere. And, as the 
source of data is interviews with respondents, the regular limitations of self-reporting of 
incidence of illness and cost of care apply. 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
Our study sheds light on a hitherto understudied dimension of hardship of very poor ru-
ral groups occasioned by the need to raise funds to pay for healthcare out-of-pocket. We 
defined “hardship financing” as borrowing with interest or selling assets. The extra cost 
due to the interest payable on money borrowed with interest is far from negligible. We 
estimated the additional costs due to interest on loans to pay for illness-related costs at 
24% of the health expenditure, a cost that represented nearly 5% of households’ annual 
overall expenditure. The monetary value of the loss due to selling assets is also not zero, 
but hard to estimate. The hardship associated with these costs extends well beyond the 
duration of the health event. 
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This analysis has shown that hardship financing occurs not only in cases of expensive 
hospitalizations (40%) but also in many cases of expenditures for outpatient (23%) and 
maternity care (25%). Taking into account that the frequency of outpatient utilization is 
much higher, many more people actually face hardship financing due to outpatient care 
than due to inpatient care. 
We have shown that possession of assets and having regular income-flow are predic-
tors of lower expected hardship financing, and better predictors than the income-proxy 
of the household used in this study. The first parameter indicates the aggregate financial 
strength of the household in an environment where many economical transactions are 
not monetary. The second parameter is self-explanatory, as regular income makes it 
easier to plan future expenses based on stable future income. Interestingly, not only the 
assets of the households with out-of-pocket healthcare costs were negatively associ-
ated with hardship financing, but also the average wealth in the community in which 
the households resides. This indicates that hardship financing is also influenced by 
attributes of the social network the household can access; better access to a wealthier 
social network seems to increase the likelihood of obtaining interest-free loans. 
Our study adds a qualitative dimension to understanding health-related financial ex-
posure among rural poor households. Hardship financing is explained not only by how 
much is spent out-of-pocket on healthcare in nominal terms or relative to income or 
assets, but also by when the payment occurs, and, as is the case with chronic illness, its 
frequency and duration. This important finding that rural poor households are subjected 
to considerable and protracted financial hardship due to the indirect and longer-term 
deleterious effects of how they cope with out-of-pocket healthcare costs points to the 
need to develop a policy solution that would limit that exposure both in quantum and 
in time. We therefore conclude that policy interventions aiming to ensure health-related 
financial protection would have to demonstrate that they have reduced the frequency 
and the volume of hardship financing. 
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Appendix 2.1 Demographics & socioeconomic status disaggregated for members and non-members
Non-member sub-cohorta Member sub-cohorta
Mean (±SEb) Mean (±SEb)
Income-proxy p.p.p.m (PPP$)c 31.98 (±0.42) 32.84 (±0.39) NS
Asset-indexd -0.16 (±0.04) 0.16 (±0.05)***
Household size 4.66 (±0.04) 4.86 (±0.03)***
Ratio infants (0-4) in household 0.085 (±0.003) 0.078 (±0.002)*
Ratio elderly (60 and older) in household 0.080 (±0.003) 0.070 (±0.003)**
Castee % of total % of total
 Scheduled Tribe 30.8% 29.2%
 Scheduled Caste 21.8% 22.8%
 Other Backward Caste 29.8% 32.7%
 General Caste 17.6% 15.3% ††
Education level household head
 No education 52.8% 49.9%
 Class 1-5 20.7% 23.7%
 Class 6-10 23.6% 23.9%
 Class 11 and higher 2.9% 2.5% ††
Occupation household head
 Self-employed agriculture 38.5% 38.9%
 Self-employed business/trade 14.6% 17.6%
 Regular Salaried employee 3.9% 5.3%
 Daily wage labourer 33.0% 28.5%
 Not working 10.0% 9.7% †††
Source of drinking water
 Own tap 8.7% 11.0%
 Shared tap 54.9% 52.9%
 Hand pump/well 36.4% 36.1% ††
Toilet facility
 Own flush toilet 4.0% 4.8%
 Own pit toilet 4.2% 5.7%
 Shared toilet 1.1% 1.0%
 No toilet 90.7% 88.6% ††
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NS = non-significant difference between member and non-member sub-cohorts
* Significance of difference between member and non-member sub-cohorts p<0.1 (ANOVA)
** Significance of difference between member and non-member sub-cohorts p<0.05 (ANOVA)
*** Significance of difference between member and non-member sub-cohorts p<0.001 (ANOVA)
†† Significance of difference in distribution between member and non-member sub-cohorts p<0.05 
(Pearson Chi-square)
††† Significance of difference in distribution between member and non-member sub-cohorts p<0.001 
(Pearson Chi-square)
a Comparison of the two sub-cohorts in our dataset: households where at least one person in the 
household was member of a Self-Help Group (SHG) linked to one of the related NGOs (member sub-
cohort) and households where no one in the household was member of a Self-Help Group (SHG) linked to 
one of the related NGOs (non-member sub-cohort).
b SE = Standard Error.
c Income is proxied as monthly per capita consumer expenditure through questions on many items of 
household expenditure and expressed in Purchasing Power Parity International Dollar. 
d Asset-index is a proxy for socioeconomic status based on various aspects of household assets. The index 
is calculated using a principal component analysis (PCA).
e Caste is a proxy for socioeconomic status in India. Scheduled Castes (Dalits and those sometimes 
labelled “untouchable”) are considered at the bottom of caste hierarchy. The list of Other Backward Castes 
is quite dynamic and changes from time to time in many states. All other castes are described here as 
General Caste.
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Appendix 2.2 Morbidity, healthcare availability, utilization and cost disaggregated for members and non-
members
Non-member
sub-cohorta
Member
sub-cohorta
Mean (±SEb) Mean (±SEb)
Total health expenditure last year for household (PPP$)c 159.32 (±7.62) 175.33 (±6.89)NS
Distance to preferred hospital (in minutes) 51.93 (±0.76) 53.03 (±0.76)NS
Distance to preferred primary care practitioner (in minutes) 30.37 (±0.56) 30.43 (±0.56)NS
% of total % of total
Household with chronic ill person 9.7% 11.3% †
Household with hospitalization costs last year 22.3% 24.7% ††
Household with outpatient care costs last year 82.9% 84.7% †
Household with maternity costs last year 15.3% 13.5% †
Household with any healthcare costs last year 84.2% 85.9% †
Hospital household usually goes to
 Private 6.5% 6.0%
  Public 93.5% 94.0% NS
Preferred primary care practitioner household usually goes to
 Traditional healer 35.6% 37.5%
 Government facility 51.4% 49.5%
 Unqualified private doctor (non-MBBS)d 7.8% 07.4%
 AYUSH practitionere 3.4% 0  3.0%
 Qualified private doctor/specialist (MBBS) 1.7% 2.7% †
NS = non-significant difference between member and non-member sub-cohorts
† Significance of difference in distribution between member and non-member sub-cohorts p<0.1 (Pearson 
Chi-square)
†† Significance of difference in distribution between member and non-member sub-cohorts p<0.05 
(Pearson Chi-square)
a Comparison of the two sub-cohorts in our dataset: households where at least one person in the 
household was member of a Self-Help Group (SHG) linked to one of the related NGOs (member sub-
cohort) and households where no one in the household was member of a Self-Help Group (SHG) linked to 
one of the related NGOs (non-member sub-cohort).
b SE = Standard Error.
c Total health expenditure last year for household expressed in Purchasing Power Parity International 
Dollar.
d Unqualified private doctor (non-MBBS) is a doctor practicing allopathic medicine without having a 
medical degree (Medical Bachelor and Bachelor of Surgery).
e AYUSH is the aggregate of all qualified systems of traditional medicines in India: Ayurveda, Yoga and 
Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homeopathy.
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ABSTRACT
Objective Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are on the increase in low-income coun-
tries, where healthcare costs are paid mostly out-of-pocket. We investigate the financial 
burden of NCDs vs. communicable diseases (CDs) among rural poor in India and assess 
whether they can afford to treat NCDs. Methods We used data from two household 
surveys undertaken in 2009–2010 among 7389 rural poor households (39 205 individu-
als) in Odisha and Bihar. All persons from the sampled households, irrespective of age 
and gender, were included in the analysis. We classify self-reported illnesses as NCDs, 
CDs or ‘other morbidities’ following the WHO classification. Results Non-communicable 
diseases accounted for around 20% of the diseases in the month preceding the survey 
in Odisha and 30% in Bihar. The most prevalent NCDs, representing the highest share 
in outpatient costs, were musculoskeletal, digestive and cardiovascular diseases. 
Cardiovascular and digestive problems also generated the highest inpatient costs. 
Women, older persons and less-poor households reported higher prevalence of NCDs. 
Outpatient costs (consultations, medicines, laboratory tests and imaging) represented 
a bigger share of income for NCDs than for CDs. Patients with NCDs were more likely to 
report a hospitalisation. Conclusions Patients with NCDs in rural poor settings in India 
pay considerably more than patients with CDs. For NCD cases that are chronic, with 
recurring costs, this would be aggravated. The cost of NCDs care consumes a big part 
of the per person share of household income, obliging patients with NCDs to rely on 
informal intra-family cross-subsidisation. An alternative solution to finance NCD care for 
rural poor patients is needed.
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3.1 BACKGROUND
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are leading causes of death globally, but nearly 
80% of NCD deaths occurred in low- and middle-income countries (WHO 2011a). In 
2004, nearly 60% of deaths worldwide were because of NCDs, and around 23% because 
of communicable diseases (CDs) (WHO 2008). In India, these percentages were 50% and 
28%, respectively (WHO 2004b). NCDs are also responsible for the biggest part of disease 
burden as assessed by disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs3), both worldwide and in the 
south-east Asian region (48% and 44%, respectively, in 2004) (WHO 2008). NCD deaths 
are projected to increase by 15% globally between 2010 and 2020; in south-east Asia, 
this increase could even be more than 20% and is a major barrier to the development 
(WHO 2011a). 
In India, around 70% of total health expenditure is paid out-of-pocket (WHO 2011a) 
and caused some 7% of rural households to drop below poverty line in 1 year (Berman 
et al. 2010). Any intervention aiming to reduce financial shocks because of illness needs 
information on prevalence and cost. As a higher burden of NCDs is unavoidable, better 
insights are needed on the morbidity of NCDs and the changing implications for out-of-
pocket healthcare expenditures. 
Most of the literature on NCDs deals with reducing the impact of NCDs by addressing 
a number of risk factors underlying most high-burden NCDs (e.g. tobacco use, physical 
inactivity, unhealthy diet, alcohol abuse). The aim of this literature is to have countries 
address these risk factors in prevention programs and reduce the burden of these NCDs. 
The burden is investigated mainly through mortality (premature death) and disability 
(DALY) because of NCDs (WHO 2011a, Beaglehole et al. 2011, Dans et al. 2011, Kinra et 
al. 2010, Lopez et al. 2006, Boutayeb & Boutayeb 2005, Murray & Lopez 1997). However, 
the information about the number of patients afflicted with NCDs and the financial 
consequence of NCDs is sorely rare. Some information is available about the prevalence 
of certain NCDs but not all. The rare studies that deal with the financial burden, also 
deal with specific NCDs. We found one study looking at cost implications of NCDs for all 
India (Engelgau et al. 2012), based on data from 1995 to 1996 and 2004 of the National 
Sample Survey Organization that provides important insights. For example, in 2004, 
almost 50% of out-of-pocket health expenses were on NCDs and medicines represented 
46% of total out-of-pocket health spending (Engelgau et al. 2012). To the best of our 
knowledge, no study examined the financial implications of NCDs amongst the most 
vulnerable segment of society in India: the rural poor. 
3. Quantification of the burden of disease which simultaneously considers both premature death (num-
ber of years of life lost due to premature death) as well as the non-fatal health consequences of disease 
and injury (number of years lived with a disability) (Murray 1994).
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The purpose of this article is to examine the financial implications of NCDs relative 
to CDs among rural poor communities in two states of India (Odisha and Bihar), taking 
into account the prevalence of illness categories, and age and income of the ill persons. 
3.2 DATA AND METHODS
3.2.1 Setting and sampling
We used data from two household surveys conducted in rural areas of Odisha (Kalah-
andi, Khorda and Malkangiri districts, January 2009) and Bihar (Gaya district, May–June 
2010). Average monthly per capita consumer expenditure for rural Odisha (INR 559, 
PPP$ 35.5) is lowest of all states in India; average expenditure for rural Bihar (INR 598, 
PPP$ 38.0) is fourth lowest (after Odisha, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand) (NSSO 2010b). 
These studies formed part of a baseline study to initiate rural micro-health insurance 
programmes, and the locations were selected in agreement with implementing local 
non-government organizations (NGOs4).
We followed a two-stage sampling procedure in each state. In stage 1, 130 villages 
(27 in Kalahandi, 22 in Khorda, 31 in Malkangiri and 50 in Gaya) were selected randomly 
from lists that local NGOs provided where they organised self-help groups (SHGs5); in 
Gaya, 50 additional villages were selected randomly from Census 2001 registry. In stage 
2, households in each village were sampled randomly by applying the ‘four winds’ (or 
‘line sampling’) technique (Som 1996). Only households where an adult was available 
at the time of the survey were sampled6. Households were sampled in two cohorts of 
equal size: member (if at least one person participated in an SHG linked to partner-
NGOs) and non-member households. Sample size was 5383 households in Odisha (25 
885 individuals) and 2006 households in Bihar (13 320 individuals). Hundred percentage 
of the sample was rural. 
The survey questionnaire was translated from English into local languages (Oriya 
and Hindi), back translated for verification, and pre-tested in each state among 80 
households. Surveyors fluent in local dialects conducted the interviews. In principle, 
4. In Odisha the Madhyam Foundation [comprising 11 grassroots NGOs: Parivartan, PUSPAC, SOMKS, 
SDS, ODC (Malkangiri); Mahashakti Foundation, DAPTA, Lok Yojana, Sanginee (Kalahandi); MVPS, DSS 
(Khorda)] and in Bihar BASIX.
5. SHGs represent a unique approach to financial intermediation in communities. The approach com-
bines access to low-cost financial services with a process of self-management and development for the 
SHG members. SHGs are seen to confer many benefits, both economic and social.
6. In rural India most of the time an adult is in the house or can be found near the house, and is willing 
to participate in an interview.
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one household member reported for all household members, but usually more persons 
were present to help. We obtained informed consent of the respondents and kept con-
fidential participants’ names in data recording and analysis. This research project met 
all the requirements of the funding agency (NWO-WOTRO) on ethical issues arising in 
social science research. 
3.2.2 Data
The data collected included general demographics of household members (age, gender, 
education, and economic activity), distance to their habitual primary care practitioner 
(min) and information on household expenditures. We obtained an income-proxy 
through questions on many items of household expenditure, following the method 
of the Indian National Sample Survey Organization (2008). Our ‘income-proxy’ is the 
monthly per capita consumer expenditure excluding healthcare costs, because we seek 
to identify patterns of financing healthcare (Flores et al. 2008, Wagstaff 2008).
The household survey also included questions on illness episodes and illness-related 
outpatient expenditures of household members during 1 month preceding the survey, 
and hospitalisations (exceeding 24 h) with related costs during 1 year preceding the sur-
vey. Information about the episodes was queried through open questions on the illness 
or symptoms that caused the episode. Illnesses that were clearly different or occurred 
at different periods were treated as separate episodes. Information about per-episode 
outpatient expenditures was collected, including consultation fees of qualified allo-
pathic practitioners, and expenditures for medicines, laboratory and imaging tests. The 
self-reported illnesses or symptoms were categorised, following the WHO classifications 
(WHO 2008), as specific categories of NCDs, CDs and ‘other morbidities’ (injuries, mater-
nal, perinatal or nutritional conditions). Ailments that could not be well defined based 
on the reported symptoms were categorized as ‘missing’. This classification of illnesses 
was carried out by two of the authors with some medical background, in consultation 
with a clinician who practiced in rural India. 
3.2.3 Analysis
All persons from the sampled households, irrespective of age and gender, were included 
in the analysis. The significance of difference between means was tested by a two-tailed 
t-test and the significance of difference of frequencies was established by chi-square 
tests. We aggregated the member and non-member sub-cohorts in each state for the 
purpose of the analysis reported here as we found no significant difference in frequency 
of reported illness episodes. 
We measured the inequality of reported illness episodes by income proxy, using con-
centration indices. An index of zero indicates there is no inequality, a negative (positive) 
index a disproportionate concentration of the health indicator among the poor (rich) 
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(O’Donnell et al. 2008). We show two versions of the index: the index as described by 
O’Donnell et al. (2008) and a corrected index as suggested by Erreygers (2009). We used 
STATA version 11.1 (StataCorp, Texas, USA) for all the analyses. 
All amounts, reported in Indian rupee (INR), were converted into international dollars 
(purchasing power parity, PPP$) using the exchange rate of PPP$ 1 = INR 16.692 for 2009 
and 18.073 for 2010. The amounts from the National Sample Survey Organization report 
of 2009 ⁄ 2010 were converted using the average exchange rate for the 2 years (17.383). 
For the report of 2007 ⁄ 2008, this rate was 15.727 (15.323 + 16.13 ⁄ 2) (IMF 2012). 
3.3 RESULTS
3.3.1 Socio-economic status of studied populations
In both populations, the income proxy is on average around the poverty line: about 
PPP$ 1 per person per day in Odisha and PPP$ 1.5 in Bihar. Considering the relevant 
data from the Indian National Sample Survey Organization (NNSO), we found that our 
sampled populations were comparable to the rural averages of their states. Most people 
depend on hard physical labour for their income as daily wage labourers (e.g. in agri-
culture, load carrying, construction) or self-employment in agriculture (39.5% in Odisha 
and 45.3% in Bihar). A minority (12.8% in Odisha and 6.5% in Bihar) is employed in what 
can be considered sedentary work (salaried employee or self-employed in business ⁄ 
trade, mainly shopkeepers, teachers). In both locations, 46% of the adult population did 
not have any education. In Bihar, 41% of the adult population have finished class 6 and 
higher compared to 36% in Odisha. This information is shown in Table 3.1. 
Around 17% of the surveyed individuals in Odisha and 31% in Bihar reported an illness 
episode in the month preceding the survey. Nearly 5.5% of the sampled population in 
Odisha and 2.5% in Bihar incurred a hospitalization in the year preceding the survey. 
Respondents in Bihar reported that they needed 18 min on average to reach their pre-
ferred primary practitioner and in Odisha, 30 min. 
3.3.2 Prevalence and classification of self-reported illness episodes
In rural Odisha or Bihar, there are no official records about illness or treatment in the 
population. Our source of information on morbidity to classify illnesses as ‘NCD’, ‘CD’ or 
‘other morbidity’ (Table 3.2) has therefore been the self-reported symptoms from our 
surveys. 
Non-communicable diseases accounted for around 20% of all diseases in Odisha and 
30% in Bihar. CDs were responsible for most of the illness episodes. The three most 
prevalent categories of NCDs in both locations were musculoskeletal, digestive and 
cardiovascular problems. The population reporting NCDs was significantly older than 
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Table 3.1 Socio-economic and demographic status of studied populations
Odisha
(N=25,885)
NSSOa
Rural Odisha
Bihar
(N=13,320)
NSSOa
Rural Bihar
  % of sampled population
Gender
Male 50.6% 51.0%
Female 49.4% 49.0%
Missing 0.05% 0.0%
Age distribution
Infant (under 5) 8.9% 9.3% 11.8% 11.7%
Child (5-14 yrs. old) 22.7% 21.9% 28.5% 28.8%
Young Adult (15-29 yrs. old) 26.0% 25.8% 25.3% 23.1%
Adult (30-44 yrs. old) 22.0% 21.3% 17.5% 20.4%
Midlife (45-59 yrs. old) 13.0% 14.2% 9.5% 10.6%
Old Age (over 60) 7.3% 7.4% 7.5% 5.3%
Missing 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Education of adult population (15 yrs. and older)b
No education 45.7% 45.8%
Class 1-5 17.0% 12.2%
Class 6-10 29.3% 32.6%
Class 11 and higher 6.5% 8.3%
Missing 1.5% 1.1%
Economic activity of adult population (15 yrs. and older)b
Daily wage labourer 20.7% 32.7%
Self-employed in agriculture 18.2% 12.2%
Self-employed in business/trade 9.4% 3.6%
Regular salaried employee 3.2% 2.8%
Domestic duties 32.2% 28.1%
Otherc 14.6% 19.7%
Missing 1.8% 1.0%
Illness episode in month preceding survey 17.0% 31.0%
Hospitalized (for more than 24 hours) in year 
preceding survey
5.6% 2.5%
Mean (±SEd)
Distance to preferred primary care practitioner 
(in minutes)
29.95 (±0.18)
(1.2% missing)
18.21 (±0.16)
(0.0% missing)
Income-proxy p.p.p.m. (PPP$)e 30.09 (±0.13)
(4.7% missing)
35.54 43.84 (±0.28)
(0.5% missing)
44.87
a National statistics data from National Sample Survey Organization of India (NSSO). Information shown 
for rural Odisha is from 2007/2008 (NSSO 2010a, NSSO 2010b) and for rural Bihar from 2009/2010 (NSSO 
2011a, NSSO 2011b), periods that correspond best to the time when our data was collected.
b Adult population: N=17,716 in Odisha; N=7,954 in Bihar.
c Other can mean going to school, being unemployed, disabled or pensioned. 
d SE = Standard Error. 
e Income is proxied as monthly per capita consumer expenditure through questions on many items of 
household expenditure and expressed in Purchasing Power Parity International Dollar. 
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the population experiencing CDs (P < 0.001, t-test, both locations). The average age of 
patients with NCDs was 42.1 (±0.6) and 37.9 (±0.6) years old, while the average age of 
patients with CDs was 27.2 (±0.4) and 21.1 (±0.4) years in Odisha and Bihar, respectively. 
Women were more afflicted with an illness (P < 0.05 in Odisha, P < 0.001 in Bihar, 
chi-square test). However, this effect was more pronounced for the prevalence of NCDs 
than CDs (P < 0.001, chi-square test, both locations): in Odisha, of those who reported 
NCDs last month, 59.0% were women and of those who reported CDs last month 51.1% 
were women. In Bihar, respectively, 65.3% and 53.9% were women.
3.3.3 Outpatient health-seeking and expenses by illness types
We explored health-seeking behaviour and costs with three types of healthcare provid-
ers: government health facility, private general practitioner (GP) and private specialist 
(Table 3.3). 
Table 3.2 Classification of self-reported illness episodes
  % of illness episodes   % of NCDs 
 
Odisha
(N=4443)
Bihar
(N=4217)
 Odisha
(N=917)
 Bihar
(N=1253)
NCDs 20.64% 29.71%
     
(Malignant) Neoplasms     0.87% 1.92%
Diabetes Mellitus     2.73% 1.44%
Endocrine disorders     0.22% 0.32%
Neuropsychiatric conditions     6.22% 3.27%
Sense organ diseases     0.11% 1.20%
Cardiovascular diseases     20.72% 10.45%
Respiratory diseases     5.67% 4.39%
Digestive diseases     23.45% 35.12%
Genitourinary diseases     2.07% 2.47%
Skin diseases     5.02% 4.31%
Musculoskeletal diseases     28.14% 32.16%
Congenital anomalies     0.44% 0.00%
Oral conditions     2.73% 2.47%
Rest     1.64% 0.48%
CDs 73.73% 51.93%    
Other morbiditiesa 5.25% 18.36%    
Missingb 0.38% 0.00%
a The group ‘other morbidities’ is comprised of injuries, maternal, perinatal or nutritional conditions.
b Ailments that could not be well defined based on the reported symptoms were categorized as ‘missing’.
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Patients with NCDs accessed healthcare providers more frequently (except govern-
ment facility in Odisha). This more frequent health seeking is most manifested in consul-
tations with private specialists. Both in government facilities and at private GPs, patients 
with NCDs paid about the same per visit as patients with CDs, but private specialists 
were costlier per visit for patients with NCDs. 
Outpatient costs often include medicines, laboratory and imaging tests. The aver-
age costs for these services are shown in Table 3.4. Two main findings emerge clearly: 
outpatient costs were lower in Bihar than in Odisha and patients with NCDs had higher 
costs than patients with CDs for all treatment categories. Aggregating all outpatient 
costs, patients with NCDs reported about double the costs of patients with CDs, in both 
locations. Medicines were the costliest item in all cases. 
Table 3.3 Frequency of access and costs of consultations
% of ill cases where treatment 
was soughta
Average cost per visit (±SEb) 
(PPP$c)
 Treatment sought with: Odisha Bihar Odisha Bihar
Government health facility
NCDs 68.9% 10.0%††† 1.43 (±0.40)
(3.7% missing)
1.22 (±0.41)
(0.0% missing)
CDs 69.3%   6.0% 1.41 (±0.11)
(4.8% missing)
0.86 (±0.23)
(0.0% missing)
Private GP
NCDs
15.9%†† 21.6%†††
5.09 (±0.67)
(1.5% missing)
6.19 (±0.51)
(0.4% missing)
CDs
11.6% 13.6%
5.19 (±0.50)
(3.9% missing)
5.81 (±0.65)
(0.0% missing)
Private specialist
NCDs
20.8%†††   9.6%†††
8.00 (±1.06)**
(4.5% missing)
11.08 (±1.50)*
(0.0% missing)*
CDs
  6.8%   3.8%
4.66 (±0.56)
(1.0% missing)
6.52 (±0.78)
(0.0% missing)
a N=917 NCD cases and 3276 CD cases in Odisha; N=1253 NCD cases and 2190 CD cases in Bihar. 
Information on treatment was missing for 23 of the CD cases in Odisha (0.7%); no information was missing 
for the NCD cases in Odisha or CD and NCD cases in Bihar.
b SE = Standard Error.
c PPP$ = Purchasing Power Parity International Dollar. 
†† Significance of difference in percentage of people that sought treatment with one of the listed 
providers out of the persons who reported either NCD or CD last month p<0.01 (Chi-square)
†††Significance of difference in percentage of people that sought treatment with one of the listed 
providers out of the persons who reported either NCD or CD last month p<0.001 (Chi-square)
*Significance of difference in cost between NCDs and CDs p<0.05 (t-test)
**Significance of difference in cost between NCDs and CDs p<0.01 (t-test)
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3.3.4 Income and the frequency of disease and its cost
We examined the association between income proxy and reported prevalence of 
NCDs and CDs (Table 3.5). The positive concentration indices describing NCDs show a 
significant ‘pro-rich’ distribution: NCDs were reported more frequently by higher income 
segments of the study populations, more so than CDs. This trend was consistent when 
calculated according to O’Donnell et al. (2008) and according to Erreygers (2009). 
Having found that the prevalence of NCDs was higher amongst the higher income 
segments of our sampled rural poor and that NCDs were costlier than CDs, we examined 
whether the two phenomena cancelled each other out. We therefore calculated out-
patient costs (reported for last month) as percentage of income proxy (per person per 
month), both for NCD and CD cases. The percentage spent by NCDs was significantly and 
materially higher than by CDs, (P < 0.001, t-test, both locations). In Odisha, patients with 
CDs spent on average 125.6% (±4.8%) of income proxy while patients with NCDs spent 
on average 180.6% (±10.6%). In Bihar, these percentages were 21.1% (±1.5%) and 41.4% 
(±3.0%), respectively. Even though NCDs were more prevalent among higher income 
Table 3.4 Outpatient expenditures
Average cost last month (±SEa) (PPP$b)
Odisha Bihar
Consultations with qualified practitioners
NCDs 4.86 (±0.52)††† 3.30 (±0.30)†††
CDs 2.31 (±0.13) 1.55 (±0.15)
Medicines
NCDs 45.24 (±2.52)††† 12.71(±1.10)†††
CDs 26.31 (±0.87) 6.52 (±0.68)
Lab tests
NCDs 2.56 (±0.38)†† 0.76 (±0.19)†
CDs 1.92 (±0.09) 0.34 (±0.05)
Imaging
NCDs 1.64 (±0.26)††† 0.94 (±0.16)†††
CDs 0.37 (±0.06) 0.14 (±0.04)
Total outpatient expenditures
NCDs 53.49 (±2.86)†††
(2.18% missing)
17.27 (±1.28)†††
(0.9% missing)
CDs 30.51 (±0.94)
(2.0% missing)
8.45 (±0.75)
(0.4% missing)
a SE = Standard Error.
b PPP$ = Purchasing Power Parity International Dollar. 
†Significance of difference in cost between NCDs and CDs p<0.05 (t-test)
††Significance of difference in cost between NCDs and CDs p<0.01 (t-test)
†††Significance of difference in cost between NCDs and CDs p<0.001 (t-test)
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segments, the treatment costs for NCDs represented a bigger share of their income. It 
can be expected that in case of chronic NCDs, these expenses will be incurred again in 
other months during the year. 
The percentages above also indicate that patients in Bihar (both CDs and NCDs) spent 
a much lower share of income on outpatient healthcare than in Odisha. The difference 
across locations seems to be because of two reasons: in Bihar (i) average income was 
higher and (ii) mean outpatient costs were lower.
3.3.5 Inpatient treatment and expenditure
We also examined the risk and cost of hospitalisations. Persons who reported an NCD 
(last month) were more likely to be hospitalised (last year) than the sampled population 
without NCDs: in Odisha 15.5% vs. 5.2%, in Bihar 5.0% vs. 2.2% (P < 0.001, chi-square 
test). The average cost of hospitalisation was comparable: in Odisha PPP$ 312 (±53) for 
patients with NCDs and PPP$ 197 (±9) for the sampled population without NCDs; in 
Bihar PPP$ 425 (±81) and PPP$ 380 (±40), respectively.
3.3.6 Share of NCD categories in outpatient and inpatient expenditures 
Finally, we analysed which category of NCDs was the costliest with respect to overall 
outpatient and inpatient expenditures (Figure 3.1). The relative share of costs is deter-
mined by the frequency of an NCD category and its severity in terms of aggregated cost. 
The two NCD categories that contributed most to overall outpatient expenditures 
(both locations) were digestive and musculoskeletal problems, followed by cardiovas-
cular and neuropsychiatric conditions. With respect to overall inpatient expenditures, 
digestive and cardiovascular diseases were amongst the three costliest. Neuropsychi-
atric, genitourinary and musculoskeletal problems were also important contributors to 
the overall costs in both locations. The cost of malignancies in Odisha seems to be much 
higher than in Bihar but is probably due to a small number of outliers as only a modest 
percentage of hospitalisations was because of cancers (9% in Odisha, 6% in Bihar).
Table 3.5 Association between income and prevalence of illness
Concentration Index  as described by 
O’Donnell et al. (2008) (±SEa)
Concentration Index as described by  
Erreygers (2009) (±SEa)
Odisha Bihar Odisha Bihar
NCD 0.157 (±0.019) 0.115 (±0.016) 0.022 (±0.003) 0.044 (±0.007)
CD 0.022 (±0.010) 0.027 (±0.011) 0.011 (±0.005) 0.018 (±0.007)
a SE = Standard Error.
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3.4 DISCUSSION
The analysis of the financial burden of NCDs on rural poor households in two states in 
India presented here differs from much of the literature on NCDs in that it considers the 
information on prevalence and treatment cost of NCDs, in general, and by the category 
of NCDs, rather than deaths or DALYs associated with NCDs. We found that, while CDs 
represent the major share of self-reported illnesses, the prevalence of NCDs is consider-
able, with about 20% of illness episodes in Odisha and 30% in Bihar. With increasing 
age (Lee & Mason 2011) and with a higher prevalence of NCDs amongst the elderly, this 
percentage is likely to increase in the future. 
Amongst the NCDs, the three most prevalent in our study populations were mus-
culoskeletal, digestive and cardiovascular diseases. These categories also represented 
the highest share of outpatient expenditures. Cardiovascular and digestive diseases 
generated the highest inpatient costs. The morbidity profile usually associated with 
NCDs (cardiovascular problems, diabetes, cancers and chronic long conditions) (WHO 
2011a) is not replicated in our study. Instead, we see higher prevalence of NCDs related 
to lifestyle, occupational and nutritional conditions of the rural poor which are exposed 
simultaneously to (i) very hard physical labour as daily wage labourers (e.g. in agriculture, 
load carrying, construction) or self-employment in agriculture (Table 3.1), (ii) unstable 
and irregular nutrition because of poverty that can cause cardiovascular diseases (Van 
Abeelen et al. 2012, Vorster & Kruger 2007) and (iii) not very hygienic living conditions 
(ADB 2009, Khurana & Sen 2008, Nath 2003). 
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Figure 3.1 Share of non-communicable disease (NCD) categories in outpatient and inpatient 
expenditures
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It is commonly claimed that poorer population segments are in worse health, also 
in low- and middle-income countries (Hosseinpoor et al. 2012). Our results showed, 
however, that self-reported illnesses, particularly NCDs, are more frequent among the 
wealthier segments of the studied populations. This finding is in accordance with a 
previous report of positive association between household income and self-reported 
incidence among poor in India (Dror et al. 2009b). Engelgau et al. (2012) also found that 
in India spending on NCDs as share of income increases by income. As we investigate 
the lowest income segments only, it is possible that members of the poorest households 
cannot afford to stop daily activities for illnesses perceived as minor, and therefore they 
do not report them. 
Analysis of the expenditure patterns of NCDs revealed several important insights. 
First, patients with NCDs sought care with private practitioners (GP or specialist) more 
frequently than patients with CDs, even though these practitioners charge more than 
government facilities. In fact, patients with NCDs even reported higher fees per visit 
with specialists than patients with CDs. The public sector in India, especially the more 
peripheral facilities, commonly suffers from shortages in qualified staff and supply. The 
population therefore is sceptical about quality of public sector services (Reddy et al. 
2011a, Peters et al. 2002, Berman 1998). Viewed in combination with the possibility that 
patients with NCDs consider their illness as requiring more serious diagnosis and treat-
ment than CDs, they might decide, despite their poverty, to prefer costlier private care. 
Second, patients with NCDs reported paying more for all types of outpatient care (con-
sultations, medicines, tests) and medicines came out to be the costliest component of 
outpatient care. These findings are in line with those of Dror et al. (2008) that medicines 
were the largest component of healthcare costs for chronic care and of Engelgau et al. 
(2012) that patients with NCDs had to bear higher costs for consultations and medicines 
than other patients. 
Third, despite the higher prevalence of NCDs among the less poor of our sampled rural 
poor, the cost for NCDs represented a bigger portion of the patient’s share in household 
income than CDs. In this analysis, we looked at outpatient costs paid out-of-pocket dur-
ing 1 month only. For chronic NCDs [many of the illnesses categorised as NCD can be 
considered chronic (WHO 2011a, Beaglehole et al. 2011, Dans et al. 2011)], clearly these 
costs can accumulate to a significant portion of the patient’s share of income over the 
year. Such high costs we believe can only be met when considerable cross-subsidisation 
occurs within the household (other household members’ share of income has to be used 
to pay the patient’s treatment). When such informal cross-subsidisation is unavailable, 
access to care becomes unaffordable. This would presumably be more likely in small 
households composed of older persons only, or in poorer households. Indeed the higher 
reporting of NCDs by households with more financial resources strengthens the impres-
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sion that the diagnosis of and treatment for NCDs strongly depends on intra-household 
cross-subsidisation. 
Finally, patients with NCDs were more likely to be hospitalised than the population 
without an NCD. And, even though the cost of a hospitalisation was comparable for 
NCD and non-NCD cases, this higher incidence of hospitalisations places an additional 
financial burden on patients with NCDs. 
At the time our surveys were conducted, the surveyed populations in Odisha and 
Bihar had practically no access to health insurance. The Government of India introduced 
hospitalisation insurance [Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY)] in 2008, which, 
however, was not implemented in the studied areas until much later (GOI 2012a). The 
information on enrolment, renewals and payment of claims is for the time being limited. 
Moreover, RSBY usually covers only the cost of care in an empanelled hospital. It has 
been shown here that most of the financial problems of patients with NCDs arise from 
financing outpatient care. As this paper goes to print, the Government of India is pilot-
ing the expansion of RSBY to include outpatient care; however, it is unclear whether this 
pilot will be generalised, or which services would be included under RSBY in the future 
(GOI 2012b, GOI 2011c). 
The big differences across the two locations included in this study do not change the 
general conclusion regarding the unaffordability of NCD care, or regarding the reliance 
of chronic NCD cases on intra-household subsidization of their care costs. However, 
these big differences in reporting illnesses deserve some considerations. The higher 
income, better education and shorter travel time to primary care practitioners in Bihar, 
compared to Odisha (Table 3.1), may have contributed to the big difference in number 
of reported illness episodes; in Bihar, the sampled population had almost twice as many 
episodes compared to Odisha. On the other hand, the average treatment costs were 
higher in Odisha than in Bihar (Table 3.4) and several reasons could explain this: supply 
aspects (e.g. fewer providers), clinical aspects (e.g. morbidity that is more expensive to 
cure, or differences in seasonal morbidity). 
This study offers a first estimation of the size of the problem of financing access to 
NCD-related care. On the basis of the results of this study, more qualitative questions 
could arise, such as, why is treatment sought with certain providers? Is there non-
compliance of treatment and why (not)? These and similar questions could be addressed 
in a qualitative follow-up study. 
A limitation of this study is that the data used for the analyses are self-reported. Re-
porting of the type, frequency, severity and cost can obviously suffer from recall bias 
and other biases, for example, underreporting of illnesses perceived as minor especially 
among the poorer households, or inaccurate reports by one household member of ill-
nesses incurred by others. 
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3.5 CONCLUSIONS
Patients with NCDs in rural poor settings in India pay considerably more for the treat-
ment than patients with CDs. This trend might be aggravated in the case of chronic NCDs 
because of the expected recurrence of outpatient expenditures, which in this study were 
analysed only for 1 month. It is self-explanatory that chronicity is less likely with CDs. 
This trend is likely to worsen over time because incidence, prevalence and chronicity are 
expected to increase with changes in lifestyle and extension of life-expectancy (WHO 
2011a, WHO 2008, Lopez et al. 2006). 
In the absence of any systemic solution (like insurance) to deal with the financing of 
access to care, we believe patients suffering from NCDs rely on intra-household cross-
subsidisation to pay for their care. This cross-subsidisation can work for as long as the 
proportion of NCD cases in the overall household population remains relatively small; 
but this proportion is likely to increase because of expected decrease in household size 
(GOI 2001b) and increase in age. Consequently, the ability of households to continue 
funding family members requiring NCD care will decrease and could lead to lower drug 
and treatment compliance. This conclusion clearly points to the urgent need to develop 
suitable policy solutions which would allow rural poor populations to afford care for 
NCDs even as NCDs are expected to increase. Such policy choices would have to cover 
outpatient care in view of its major contribution to the financial burden of patients with 
NCDs. 
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ABSTRACT
Objective Against the backdrop of insufficient public supply of primary care and reports 
of informal providers, the present study sought to collect descriptive evidence on 1st 
contact curative health care seeking choices among rural communities in two States of 
India - Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Odisha. Methods The cross-sectional study design com-
bined a Household Survey (1,810 households in AP; 5,342 in Odisha), 48 Focus Group 
Discussions (19 in AP; 29 in Odisha), and 61 Key Informant Interviews with healthcare 
providers (22 in AP; 39 in Odisha). Results In AP, 69.5 per cent of respondents accessed 
non-degree allopathic practitioners (NDAPs) practicing in or near their village; in Odisha, 
40.2 per cent chose first curative contact with NDAPs and 36.2 per cent with traditional 
healers. In AP, all NDAPs were private practitioners, in Odisha some pharmacists and 
nurses employed in health facilities, also practiced privately. Respondents explained 
their choice by proximity and providers’ readiness to make house-calls when needed. 
Less than a quarter of respondents chose qualified doctors as their first point of call: 
mostly private practitioners in AP, and public practitioners in Odisha. Amongst those 
who chose a qualified practitioner, the most frequent reason was doctors’ quality rather 
than proximity. Conclusions The results of this study show that most rural persons seek 
first level of curative healthcare close to home, and pay for a composite convenient ser-
vice of consulting-cum-dispensing of medicines. NDAPs fill a huge demand for primary 
curative care which the public system does not satisfy, and are the de facto first level 
access in most cases. 
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4.1 BACKGROUND
Primary curative outpatient healthcare is in great demand in India. According to National 
Health Accounts (GOI 2005a), 88 per cent of households’ health expenditure is spent on 
curative services, of which 48 per cent is towards primary curative care, also defined as 
“ambulatory or outpatient treatment of illness” (Berman 1998). Dror et al. (2008) investi-
gated the cost of illness among the poor in five locations in India and reported that 33 
per cent of the costs were attributed to consultations and 49 per cent to payment for 
drugs. 
National surveys suggest that the proportion of persons falling sick and seeking 
curative care in rural and urban India is comparable: the National Sample Survey (60th 
Round) reported 823/1000 ailments treated (in the 15 days preceding the survey) in 
rural vs. 893/1000 in urban areas (NSSO 2006); this difference is offset by the higher 
proportion of rural population (more than 70%) (GOI 2001a), so in absolute numbers, 
rural treatment-seekers outnumber urban ones. 
Despite a larger demand for healthcare among rural persons, the quality and quantity 
of healthcare supply is relatively lower in rural than in urban areas (De Costa & Diwan 
2007, GOI 2005d). For instance, a survey of all healthcare providers in the State of Madhya 
Pradesh (population 60.4 million) enumerated 24,807 qualified doctors, of whom, 75.6 
per cent worked in the private sector, mostly (80%) in urban areas (De Costa & Diwan 
2007). 
Ambulatory outpatient care is supposed to be available in rural areas through the 
public delivery system at Primary Health Centres (PHCs). Each PHC serves on average 
30,000 persons and is managed by a medical doctor. A PHC is linked to 6 sub-centres 
(SCs), each serving about 5,000 persons, and managed by an Auxiliary Nurse Midwife 
(ANM) who delivers family planning services, some maternity care and immunizations. 
Secondary level care is supposed to be delivered by Community Health Centres (CHCs), 
where four specialist doctors should offer specialized care to 120,000 persons (GOI 
2008). A district hospital at the top provides tertiary referral care and supervision. 
This basic 3-tier system has not changed since it was proposed by India’s first Health 
Survey and Development Committee (Bhore 1946), but the Committee’s recommended 
‘population norm’ of one PHC per 10,000-20,000 population has never been achieved. 
With a current infrastructure of 23,458 PHCs and 4,276 CHCs, and with 18.8 per cent 
vacancies in PHC doctors’ positions and 51.6 per cent vacancies in CHC specialists’ posi-
tions (GOI 2008), the system suffers from inadequate infrastructure and doctor shortages 
(Satpathy 2005), while India’s rural population has grown to more than 700 million (GOI 
2001a). There is low utilization of primary outpatient care in public facilities because of 
long distances, inconvenient opening hours, lengthy waiting, staff absenteeism, poor 
availability of medicines, and poor quality of care (Dalal & Dawad 2009, Kotwani et al. 
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2007, Ager & Pepper 2005). One analysis showed that public facilities were utilized by 
people in low income States more than by people in high- and middle-income States 
(Purohit 2004).
Evidence suggests that rural people seek outpatient primary care from private pro-
viders for many conditions, including new-born/child illnesses (Deshmukh et al. 2009, 
Kaushal et al. 2005), malaria/febrile illnesses (Chaturvedi et al. 2009), TB (Fochsen et al. 
2006) and women’s health (Rani & Bonu 2003). People’s choice of provider may reflect 
provider proximity, cost, reputation, perceived ‘recovery’, lack of faith in the public 
sector, and lay notions of aetiology (Dongre et al. 2008, Ager & Pepper 2005, Kamat 
1995). The private health sector in rural India includes a heterogeneous mix of provid-
ers; some are professionally trained, but the majority are unqualified. A survey done in 
2007 enumerated only about 28 per cent qualified doctors (De Costa & Diwan 2007). 
Almost all the 89,090 unqualified providers practiced as private rural practitioners. Dif-
ferent types of practitioners and systems have existed in rural India. Studies from the 
1960s and 1970s reported that traditional healers or indigenous medical practitioners 
used both modern and traditional medicines (Bhatia et al. 1975). Later studies refer to 
“rural medical practitioners” (Rohde & Vishwanathan 1994) following mainly allopathic 
treatment practices. More recent studies have reported that in rural areas health-seekers 
approached traditional healers (Chaturvedi et al. 2009, Dongre et al. 2008) and also 
qualified practitioners of AYUSH (Ayurveda, Unani, Siddha and Homeopathy systems) 
(De Costa & Diwan 2007). However, only a minority (14%) utilize the pure traditional 
cures (Singh et al. 2005). 
The Indian government launched its National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) in 2005 to 
increase access and quality of healthcare in rural areas (GOI 2005b). The present study 
conducted in 2008-2009, sought to investigate the post NRHM status of curative health 
care seeking at first contact among rural communities. Evidence collected from health 
care seekers (demand side) was juxtaposed with evidence collected from providers 
(supply side) on first contact healthcare, including the illnesses, patients’ choices and 
providers’ patient load, treatments, medicines, and referrals. This study embraces a 
horizontal approach in investigating first contact curative care, regardless of the cause, 
and by all providers participating de-facto in the health system.
4.2 DATA AND METHODS
This study was part of a larger baseline study to initiate rural micro health insurance 
programmes in two states – Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Odisha. Field work was conducted 
in AP during May-June 2008 and in Odisha during January-February 2009. 
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4.2.1 Quantitative methods 
4.2.1.1 Household survey
Sampling: In the two districts in AP there were 2031villages with a total population of 
5,359,959 spread across 1,257,235 households (GOI 2001a). In the three districts in Odisha 
(Kalahandi, Malkangiri and Khorda), there were 4436 villages, and a total population of 
2,776,546 spread across 602,561households. For AP with a total of 1257,235 households 
and an assumed 10 per cent frequency of visiting qualified physicians (obtained by dis-
cussions with community leaders) the calculated sample size for an error of 2% and 99% 
confidence level was 1491 households. For Odisha, with a total of 602,561 households, 
the calculated sample size was 1489. The actual sample included 1,810 households in AP 
and 5,342 in Odisha. 
The villages were selected purposively, where local organizations were involved in the 
micro health insurance project [Cooperative Development Foundation (CDF) in AP and 
the Madhyam Foundation in Odisha with its 11 affiliated NGOs]; 20 villages in AP (12 in 
Warangal and 8 in Karimnagar districts) and 80 villages in Odisha (27 in Kalahandi, 22 
in Khorda, and 31 in Malkangiri districts). In every village, two cohorts were randomly 
sampled counting the same number of households: members of self-help groups (SHGs), 
and non-member households. 
The SHGs were savings and borrowing societies that were already present at the two 
sites. The micro health insurance was intended only for existing SHG members, and we 
wanted to make sure that there was no difference in socio-economic status or education 
between the prospective insured and uninsured (to eliminate any confounding differ-
ences later on in our impact analysis). 
Research tool and implementation: A structured questionnaire was developed in 
English, translated into Telugu and Oriya, and validated through back translation and 
cognitive pre-testing in 80 households each in AP and in Odisha, and modified as 
necessary. Project personnel trained local investigators to carry out the interviews. The 
questionnaire included close-ended questions on respondents’ socio-demographic 
characteristics, healthcare utilization, providers approached first by household mem-
bers for outpatient care when ill, and reasons for approaching these providers. In the 
Odisha survey, the inquiry was refined to confirm whether allopathic practitioners were 
degree vs. non-degree [which was inferred in AP by combining household survey and 
focus group discussion (FGD) data]. 
The method as adopted by the Indian National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) 
was followed to obtain a proxy for income through questions on many items of house-
hold expenditures. Similar to NSSO, the monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) served 
as proxy for income. 
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4.2.2 Qualitative methods
4.2.2.1 Focus group discussions (FGDs)
Sampling: A total of 19 FGDs (9 men’s, 10 women’s) in AP, and 29 FGDs (13 men’s and 16 
women’s) were conducted in Odisha; 214 persons participated in FGDs in AP (96 men 
and 118 women), and 314 in Odisha (121 men, 193 women). Villages for FGDs were 
selected (5 in AP and 15 in Odisha) by location within districts, distance from towns and 
from medical facility (near, medium or far). Participants in FGDs were men and women 
aged 25 to 45 yr. Groups were gender- and income homogenous (proxy for income was 
land ownership). As far as possible, the same number of FGDs was conducted with males 
and females in each village.
Research tool and implementation: An FGD guide (pre-tested with 2 male and 2 female 
focus groups in each State) was developed and local persons (2 in AP, 4 in Odisha) were 
trained to facilitate discussions on morbidity and incidence, health seeking decisions, 
first providers approached, perceptions of how providers treated and what they charged. 
The facilitators were debriefed after every session. All FGDs were held in settings ensur-
ing privacy and confidentiality to participants. 
4.2.2.2 Key informant interviews (KII)
Sampling: KIIs were conducted with 9 village-based providers in AP and 20 in Odisha, 
plus solo general practitioners (GPs) and specialists in nearby towns, and hospital-based 
providers (13 in AP and 19 in Odisha). First popular providers were located and inter-
viewed and then other providers were identified with their help. 
Research tools and implementation: Semi-structured interview tools were developed 
per provider category (pre-tested with 4-6 providers in each State) to collect informa-
tion on education and training of village providers, practice characteristics, services 
rendered, and types of patients. Interviews in health facilities or with GPs focused on 
listing services, staff, and basic information on patients.
4.2.3 Ethical compliance
This research project met all the requirements of the funding agency (NWO-WOTRO) 
on ethical issues arising in social science research. The research document for all the in-
terventions (e.g. FGDs, household survey interviews, and KIIs) included an introductory 
section tantamount to a protocol of informed choice in which the researchers explained 
the purpose of the study, what would be done with the data, and sought and obtained 
verbal consent of participants to participate in the interviews and discussions, and to 
record the FGD meetings. Participants’ names were kept confidential in data recording 
and analysis. All interviews were organized so as to ensure interviewees that confiden-
tiality would be kept.
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4.2.4 Analysis
SPSS v.17 was used to analyse household survey data. We organised the taped, tran-
scribed and translated FGD data into matrices and explored similarities, differences, 
recurrent themes and categorizations within data driven sub themes, broadly cover-
ing perceptions of common diseases, hierarchy of care seeking, characteristics of and 
perceptions related to providers of first contact. KII data were entered in Excel, and 
simple frequencies for close-ended questions were calculated. Open-ended questions 
were entered verbatim and analysed qualitatively to determine common characteristics, 
relationship with communities, and treatment patterns.
4.3 RESULTS
4.3.1 Socio-economic status of studied populations
The study populations in the two States reported significantly different household 
incomes. Median MPCE in AP was INR 1,289, more than twice that of Odisha (INR 504). 
The proportion of Scheduled Tribes (STs) was significantly (P<0.001) higher in Odisha 
than in AP, while the proportion of OBCs was higher (P<0.001) in AP. Illiteracy was higher 
(P<0.001) in Odisha (Table 4.1). There were also differences in economic activity of 
household heads: in Odisha the largest group was that of self-employed small farmers, 
while the largest group in AP was composed of casual wage labourers. No significant 
differences were found between SHG members and non-members. Women formed the 
majority of household survey respondents in both States: 72.3 per cent in AP and 67.7 
per cent in Odisha. Other available household members, if present, also contributed. 
In AP as village sizes were bigger than in Odisha and there was sufficient represen-
tation of men and women from different socio-economic groups, four different FGDs 
were organized per village (2 men’s and 2 women’s) representing poor and better off 
households in each village. In most of the poorer groups, half or more of the participants 
were illiterate and a few only had completed 10 years of schooling. However, literacy dif-
ferences were less pronounced in the women’s groups where even the better off groups 
had more illiterate than literate members. Participants in the poorer groups were either 
landless and worked as “coolies” (daily wage farm labourers), or as other types of daily 
wage labourers (e.g. loaders), or had small farms less than 3 acres in size but also some-
times worked as “coolies” or ran small businesses (such as a small shop) to supplement 
their farm income. Participants in the better off groups usually owned medium sized 
(3-6 acres) farms and a few owned bigger ones (10-20 acres). These groups also had 
participants with less land but with bigger businesses (e.g. tailor) and some had salaried 
jobs (e.g. teacher, driver). 
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In Odisha, villages were smaller and communities more homogenous with respect to 
occupations and land ownership. Thus only two FGDs could be organized per village, 
one male and one female. In general, there were more illiterate participants here than 
in AP. While in each district 1-2 FGDs comprised landless daily wage labourers (e.g. farm 
labour/constructions workers/small vendors), the majority were small farmers with 1-5 
acres of land. As in AP the latter supplemented their income through daily wage activi-
ties, or through small businesses such as selling fruits, vegetables and also fish, and in 
those villages that were close to the capital city of Bhubaneswar, through salaried jobs 
(e.g. clerks and peons).
4.3.2 Providers of first health-seeking contact
In both States, FGD narratives suggested that the first response to an illness could be 
self-medication, with men more likely to buy an over-the-counter paracetamol or other 
medicine and the women more likely to rely on home remedies. When these were not 
effective, they sought care from available providers. In AP, 94.8 per cent household 
survey respondents usually approached an allopathic practitioner first (Figure 4.1); most 
(69.5%) approached private allopathic practitioners in the same village or nearby vil-
lage and 22.1 per cent approached private practitioners in town. FGDs revealed that in 
villages, private ‘allopathic’ practitioners were informally trained and unlicensed, often 
Table 4.1 Profile of the study communities in Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Orissa
AP
(n=1810
Orissa
(n=5342)
Caste of household head
Scheduled Tribe   2.3% 30.0%††
Scheduled Caste 18.6% 22.3%†
Other Backward Caste 61.9% 31.3%††
Other Caste 17.1% 16.5%
Literacy of household head
Illiterate 44.8% 51.3%††
Activity of household head
Casual wage labourer 42.1% 30.8%††
Self-employed in agriculture 26.2% 38.7%††
Self-employed in business/trade 15.7% 16.1%
Regular salaried employee   8.3%   4.6%††
Rest (non-income earning)   7.7%   9.8%
Median MPCEa (INR) 1289 504*
a MPCE = Monthly Per Capita Consumer Expenditure
† Significance of difference between Orissa and Bihar p<0.01 (Chi-square)
††Significance of difference between Orissa and Bihar p<0.001 (Chi-square)
*Significance of difference in cost between Orissa and Bihar p<0.001 (ANOVA)
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called Registered Medical Practitioner (RMPs), a designation used in some States until 
the 1970s, and still included in some State Medical Councils (Madhya Pradesh Medical 
Council 1987), but currently synonymous with unregistered practitioners without formal 
qualifications in medicine. We refer to these as non-degree allopathic providers (NDAPs). 
In Odisha 53.1 per cent of respondents had their first health-seeking contact was with 
an allopathic practitioner; of these 40.2 per cent approached NDAPs and 12.9 per cent 
consulted qualified physicians (Figure 4.2). In the FGDs, people referred to the NDAP 
as “choto doctor” (small doctor). Triangulation of the household survey, FGDs and KIIs 
showed that in Odisha, some NDAPs (e.g. pharmacists, nurses and compounders) were 
employed in government health centres, and treated patients in villages for-a-fee. In 
Odisha, 32.6 per cent of household survey respondents usually approached such “public 
sector NDAPs” first, mostly in the same or nearby village (27.6%) (Figure 4.2). 
Around a quarter or less of respondents in both States approached qualified doctors 
in the first instance. In AP, these were doctors in private practice in nearby towns (22.1% - 
Figure 4.1), whereas public practitioners were mentioned by only 3.2 per cent. In Odisha 
a smaller proportion of respondents (12.9%) approached qualified doctors first, and the 
majority of those (10.7%) went to public sector doctors (Figure 4.2). 
A substantial proportion of respondents in Odisha (36.2%) also approached other 
non-allopathic practitioners first: traditional healers. Fewer households approached 
other types of practitioners: only 0.2 per cent respondents in AP and 4.2 per cent in 
Odisha approached AYUSH practitioners, and 5 per cent in AP and 6.4 per cent in Odisha 
approached government health workers like ANMs, ASHAs (Accredited Social Health 
Activist) and AWWs (Aanganwadi Worker). 




 


 
Figure 4.1 First care seeking contact in Andhra Pradesh
66Chapter 4
4.3.3 Association between income and choice of provider
In view of the diversity of first contact providers, association between income of the 
population (MPCE quintiles) and choice of first contact provider was examined, a sig-
nificant association was seen in Odisha but not in AP (Table 4.2). In Odisha, a significant 
decrease was observed in the frequency of accessing traditional healers with income, 
which was mainly due to a lower frequency in the fifth income quintile. A positive 
association was found between income quintiles and frequency of seeking care with 
qualified doctors. The lowest quintile reported 7.4 per cent and the highest 20.6 per 
cent. There was a small but significant increase in the frequency of choosing NDAPs with 
increasing income. 
4.3.4 Reasons for choice of first contact provider
Respondents named proximity as the most important reason for their choice of first 
contact provider. It was the main reason for a majority of respondents that approached 
NDAPs and traditional healers (77.5% in AP and 58.9% in Odisha for NDAPs; 67.9% 
for traditional healers in Odisha; Table 4.3). Fewer respondents named their reason as 
provider being ‘best’ (18.1% in AP and 32.7% in Odisha for NDAPs; 20.3% for traditional 
healers in Odisha). However, among those who approached a qualified doctor first, a 
majority said it was because that provider was ‘best’ (56.0% AP; 58.2% Odisha) followed 
by ‘closest’ (38.9% AP; 35.8% Odisha). 
4.3.5 Provider profiles and people’s perceptions
Traditional healers: Traditional healers provided a substantial proportion of health care 
at first contact in Odisha but not in AP. In Odisha, over one-third of the household survey 
respondents usually sought first consultation with traditional healers (Figure 4.2) as they 
were their closest providers (Table 4.3).
These practices could not be generalized across all study communities, since care 
seeking from traditional healers was expressed more by groups that were more remotely 



































Figure 4.2 First care seeking contact in Orissa (allopathic practitioner details)
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located and had fewer allopathic options in or around their villages, or among groups 
with greater economic impoverishment. These findings were in agreement with the 
household survey results that showed an inverse relationship between income and care 
seeking from traditional healers. However, tribal populations (STs) chose traditional heal-
ers less frequently than SCs and OBCs (28.3 vs. 43.3% and 40.2% respectively, P<0.001). 
There was no significant association between frequency of choice of traditional healer 
and literacy. 
Non-degree allopathic providers (NDAPs): NDAPs were sought by almost 70 per cent 
household survey respondents in AP and 40 per cent in Odisha. NDAPs in AP were 
private practitioners but in Odisha people also sought care from public sector NDAPs. 
Some employees in government health centres, especially the primary health centres 
(PHCs) including pharmacists, nurses, and even health attendants, acted as NDAPs in 
Odisha in three situations: firstly, when the health facility had no doctor and was man-
aged entirely by non-doctor staff. Doctor shortages in Malkangiri (with large tracts of 
inaccessible areas) were particularly acute. Secondly, when a doctor was assigned, but 
absent from duty for any reason, some of the doctor’s tasks were routinely performed 
by other health workers. Thirdly, when the doctor was present but patient load at the 
Table 4.2 Type of provider first approached by different MPCE quintiles in Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Orissa
NDAPa
Traditional 
healer
Qualified 
doctor
AYUSH 
practitionerb
ANMc/ 
ASHAd/ 
AWWe
Any others
AP
Quintile 1 67.3% N/Ag 26.5% 0.3% 4.5% 1.4%
Quintile 2 69.5% N/Ag 25.1% 0.0% 4.2% 1.1%
Quintile 3 69.3% N/Ag 22.5% 0.0% 5.9% 2.3%
Quintile 4 71.3% N/Ag 21.7% 0.3% 6.2% 0.6%
Quintile 5 72.6% N/Ag 21.8% 0.3% 4.5% 0.8%
Significance nsf nsf nsf nsf nsf
Orissa
Quintile 1 35.0% 39.9% 7.4% 3.1% 14.6% N/Ag
Quintile 2 37.1% 44.8% 9.4% 2.3% 6.4% N/Ag
Quintile 3 42.3% 37.4% 12.4% 3.1% 4.8% N/Ag
Quintile 4 40.2% 34.1% 14.9% 6.3% 4.5% N/Ag
Quintile 5 45.7% 25.2% 20.6% 5.8% 2.8% N/Ag
Significance ††† ††† ††† ††† †††
a NDAP = Non-degree allopathic practitioner.
b practitioner of Ayurveda, Unani, Siddha and Homeopathy systems.
c ANM = Auxiliary nurse midwife.
d ASHA = Accredited social health activist.
e AWW = Aanganwadi worker.
f ns = non-significant difference between the different income quintiles
g N/A = not applicable
††† Significance of difference between the different income quintiles p<0.01 (Chi-square)
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facility was high, other health workers (e.g. pharmacists, nurses, female/male health 
workers, health attendants) performed some of the doctor’s tasks. 
From the FGDs with men and women, and KIIs with 9 NDAPs, some common charac-
teristics as well as differences were identified between private NDAPs in the two States. 
All were male. Their average age was 36 yr. in AP (range of 24 to 50 yr.) and 43 yr. in 
Odisha (range of 28 to 60 yr.). All had well-established independent practices with an 
average professional experience of 13.3 yr. in AP and 20.5 yr. in Odisha. The majority 
had completed 10 or more years of schooling. Most NDAPs acquired skills through in-
formal apprenticeships, usually with other doctors both private and public. NDAPs in 
AP delivered mainly mobile services. All 9 possessed mobile phones and responded to 
emergency calls plus provided services within a radius of 0-5 km (1-5 villages) of where 
they lived; two who owned a scooter/motorcycle extended their catchment area to 20-
25 km. Five NDAPs also had rudimentary clinics. Most, however, spent between 6 and 
12 h daily circulating in villages and providing doorstep services. In Odisha, only half 
the NDAPs provided mobile healthcare in a larger radius of 5-20 km from their village; 
those who had a motorcycle travelled longer distances. The other half combined static 
and mobile services, during 1-4 h daily for rounds or to respond to calls, within a smaller 
radius of 2-5 km. 
Most NDAPs in AP saw 20 or more patients daily (range from 10 to 70 patients); mobile 
providers had most patients. In Odisha, NDAPs saw a smaller average of 12 patients 
daily (range from 2 to 40 patients) and older practitioners had higher patient-loads. The 
providers were asked to estimate their catchment population (households they usually 
served). In AP, it ranged from 50 to 300 households, with an average of 100 households. 
In Odisha, it ranged from 40 to 1200 households with an average of 300 households. 
NDAPs in both States treated the most commonly reported morbidities. We compared 
five most frequently treated conditions named by NDAPs with replies to the household 
survey question: “Did a person in the household have an illness episode last month? 
What kind of illness was it?” The information from both sources tallied closely (Table 
4.4). ‘Fever’ topped the list, followed by body pains and GI symptoms in AP, and malaria 
in Odisha. 
Table 4.3 Reasons why household survey respondents chose first contact health provider
AP Orissa
Closest Best Cheapest Closest Best Cheapest
NDAPsa 77.5% 18.1% 1.4% 58.9% 32.7% 2.3%
Traditional healer N/A N/A N/A 67.9% 20.3% 5.1%
Qualified doctor 38.9% 56.0% 1.6% 35.8% 58.2% 1.7%
Overall 66.5% 27.6% 2.2% 57.8% 30.6% 5.8%
a NDAP = Non-degree allopathic practitioner.
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NDAPs in both States used allopathic medicines to provide symptomatic relief. Typi-
cally, they dispensed medicines for 2-3 days (rarely up to a week), and if there was no 
improvement, they referred patients. NDAPs also referred in emergencies, sometimes 
providing first aid or accompanying patients to a qualified physician or hospital. In Odi-
sha, NDAPs sometimes performed simple diagnostic tests (e.g. blood test for malaria). 
Some NDAPs also prescribed drugs additional to those they dispensed. We listed 37 
brand names of drugs named by NDAPs in AP and 49 in Odisha (Table 4.5). The various 
drug types mentioned were classified by mode of action (following CIMS India Refer-
ence System) (CIMS India ). CIMS information revealed that 44 manufacturers produced 
the 37 AP brands and 48 produced the 49 Odisha brands. This suggests that NDAPs were 
familiar with multiple branded drugs with different names (different manufacturers) 
and that these brands were available over the counter in the retail market, from where 
NDAPs said they restocked their supplies weekly or fortnightly. NDAPs used mostly four 
classes of drugs: analgesics/antipyretics/antimalarial, vitamin and iron supplements, 
antibacterial and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) (Table 4.5). In Odisha, 
three providers also dispensed ayurvedic remedies. AP providers mentioned no indig-
enous medicines. Some NDAPs also gave nutritional advice on consumption of foods 
rich in vitamins and minerals such as leafy vegetables, eggs, milk and fruits. 
NDAPs were asked to name five common conditions for which they referred patients, 
and where they referred to. Most NDAPs referred for gynaecological problems (e.g. 
pregnancy and institutional delivery), pains, chronic non-communicable conditions 
(e.g. heart problems, hypertension, diabetes, kidney related problems), acute fevers 
Table 4.4 Most common symptoms/illnesses reported by household survey respondents and private 
NDAPs in AP and Orissa
AP Orissa
Symptoms
No. of providers 
reported these 
among top 
symptoms (KIIsa)
Reported as illnesses 
in last month (HHSb) 
(%)
No. of providers 
reported these 
among top 
symptoms (KIIsa)
Reported as illnesses 
in last month (HHSb) 
(%)
Fevers (including 
typhoid)
8/9 44.0% 11/19 50.6%
Malaria, dengue, 
kala-azar, 
chikungunya
N/A 1.2% 8/15 14.0%
Body pain / joint 
pain
9/9 15.8% 9/15 5.4%
Gastrointestinal 
symptoms (GI)
9/9 8.5% 14/15 8.3%
a KII= Key informant interviews.
b HHS = Household Survey.
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and gastrointestinal conditions, and in Odisha also for accidents and injuries including 
snakebites. 
NDAPs usually referred to private doctors in AP, and to public facilities in Odisha. In 
Odisha, the public sector doctors (especially in peripheral facilities) confirmed that 
NDAPs referred cases for pregnancy, delivery and for serious conditions (e.g. malaria 
and pneumonia). 
Yet we could not find any incentive for NDAPs to refer cases, either through training 
to improve recognition of referral conditions, or through financial incentives similar to 
those that government workers like ASHAs receive for each delivery they refer. In AP, 
NDAPs who referred to private doctors, received occasional gifts (like table calendars) 
but no financial incentives. 
Qualified doctors: Around a quarter of household survey respondents in AP and 
roughly half that proportion in Odisha approached qualified allopathic doctors at first 
contact (Figure 4.1 & 4.2). The major difference was that doctors approached in AP were 
primarily town based private practitioners while in Odisha they were public servants 
employed at government PHCs and CHCs. 
FGDs and KIIs confirmed these two different State scenarios. In AP, FGD participants, 
both men and women, named a number of private doctors and facilities that they 
approached in nearby towns, whereas in Odisha, when participants talked about care 
seeking from a qualified doctor, they usually referred to a government facility identifi-
able by its location and referred to as a “hospital” irrespective of whether it was a PHC or 
a CHC or a tertiary hospital. 
Table 4.5 Drugs named by private NDAPs in AP and Orissa
AP Orissa
Drug classa
No. of names 
mentioned by 
providers
No. of NDAPsb 
mentioned this drug 
class (KIIsc)
No. of names 
mentioned by 
providers
No. of NDAPsb 
mentioned this drug 
class (KIIsc)
Analgesics & 
antipyretics 
(including 
antimalarials)
3 brand names
2 generics
9/9 6 brand names
3 generic
14/15
Vitamins & 
haematopoietic
2 brand names 8/9 13 brand names
5 generics
13/15
Antibacterial (oral) 6 brand names
8 generics
8/9 11 brand names
5 generic
11/15
Non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs
9 brand names
1 generic
9/9 3 brand names
1 generic
7/15
a Source: Central Index of Medical Specialities (CIMS), India (CIMS India ).
b NDAPs = Non-degree allopathic practitioners.
c KII= Key informant interviews.
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However, whether public or private, people usually approached these qualified doc-
tors as the second step in their care seeking pathway, if the first level intervention in the 
village did not succeed, or in multiple care-seeking at the same level (e.g. going from 
one specialist to another in AP). FGDs suggested that seeking first contact care from 
qualified doctors was related to (i) economic status of the household as only better off 
households could afford the total higher costs (of transport, wage loss, fees, medicines, 
and tests) of approaching a qualified doctor, (ii) perceived severity of the health condi-
tion: if the condition was seen as beyond the scope of the village doctor (e.g. a snake 
bite or a heart problem), then people would bypass the village level and go straight to 
a doctor, and (iii) proximity to the provider/facility: those communities that lived within 
easy walking distance of a health facility in Odisha were likely to go straight to that 
facility first.
In AP, people had access to many private doctors even at block level towns and semi 
urban areas, but not so at the village level. In Odisha, especially in the poorer districts of 
Kalahandi and Malkangiri, government PHCs and CHCs were the main source of care by 
qualified physicians (who were government employees), and these were located even in 
villages beyond the block towns. Although Odisha respondents accessed public facili-
ties more than in AP, many of these facilities were understaffed, especially in Malkangiri 
and Kalahandi districts. Malkangiri’s Chief Medical Officer informed that only 33 out of 
100 sanctioned medical doctors were available in the district public health system. 
The private sector provided rural AP communities with a multiplicity of options for 
care seeking from qualified physicians, and both men and women, even from poorer 
households appeared to prefer private to public because of better perceived care 
and treatment. For women, it was familiarity and faith in the doctor and the doctor’s 
kindness that was important. More than one women’s group close to a certain town 
(Narsampet) named the same doctors repeatedly as being among the nicer ones whom 
they approached both for general illnesses and for women’s problems as well. 
In AP, men, much more than women, had a tendency to analyse the mode of operation 
of private qualified doctors. They complained about the high costs, doctors’ business 
orientation and malpractices but they still preferred to go to private doctors. 
In AP, use of public primary facilities was limited to immunizations at the PHCs. 
Although intended for the poor and cheaper than private, public facilities were none-
theless not perceived as poor-friendly by poor consumers. In Odisha, public facilities 
were people’s major and, in many places, only source of access to a qualified physician. 
Though doctor consultations were usually free of charge in PHCs and CHCs and even 
the sub-divisional hospitals, people said that doctors usually prescribed medicines and 
tests from outside private sources. In FGDs, people repeatedly complained about two 
problems: (i) the money they had to spend on transport to reach public facilities - an 
amount that could exceed the cost of medicines; and (ii) the money they had to spend 
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out-of-pocket for medicines and tests, and at one district hospital (which allowed private 
practice by public doctors) also for the doctors’ consultation fee.
4.4 DISCUSSION
Through multifarious strategies and enhanced funding, the Government of India pro-
vides accessible, affordable and quality healthcare to rural persons. The National Rural 
Health Mission (NRHM) launched in 2005 for implementation up to 2012 is the most 
recent large-scale programme to strengthen the existing 3-tier public health delivery 
system (GOI 2005b). Our study demonstrated that the huge need for primary level cura-
tive healthcare was different from what the 3-tier system has been able to provide, and 
that this need was satisfied mainly outside the public system. For one, the data showed 
that the overwhelming reason given for the choice of first contact curative provider was 
proximity. From the FGDs it was known that the proximate providers were also available 
at all hours of the day and night, and responded to telephone calls. 
The doctors at public, and even more at private health facilities, often required that 
patients undergo diagnostic tests and buy prescribed medicines, the combined cost of 
which was high, plus there were indirect costs of transportation and wage-loss. NDAPs 
were much closer to care-seekers in villages, made house calls when requested, charged 
lower fees and provided the all-in-one “quick-fix” service. Thus, more than 75 per cent of 
the population preferred to go to NDAPs and (in Odisha) also to traditional healers for 
first contact curative care. This evidence demonstrates that people seek a different type 
of primary curative care, which is not doctor-centric and is delivered not in a faraway 
doctor’s clinic, and for which clients are willing to pay.
The people did not choose their first contact provider by whether he was a “small 
doctor” or a “big doctor”. Frequently, factors like distance and cost determined people’s 
care-seeking preferences more than providers’ skills or accreditation. This alternative 
treatment trail was mostly at odds with government policy, and people consulted pro-
fessional doctors only when they, or their first contact NDAP, perceived a specific reason 
to do so. 
Consistent with previous evidence (Dalal & Dawad 2009, Satpathy 2005), staff short-
ages and low utilization of the public sector were found. However, our findings do not 
uphold the assumption that the need among rural communities for proximate all-in-
one primary curative healthcare would disappear even if all the PHCs and CHCs were to 
become fully staffed and well equipped. Thus, if the public system should deliver such 
care, health planners would need to revise the objectives and deliverables of the various 
tiers in the public system. 
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Our evidence on practice of NDAPs not only confirms previous reports about their 
widespread presence in rural areas (De Costa & Diwan 2007, Berman 1998), but also 
gives new details about the existence, in addition to private practitioners, of “public 
sector NDAPs”. 
Some scholars have explained the recourse to traditional healers (accessed by 36% 
of care seekers in Odisha) by reference to illiteracy and tribal cultures (Vijayakumar et 
al. 2009); in our examination, this explanation was not confirmed, as there was no sig-
nificant difference in the rate of consulting traditional healers across literate or illiterate 
household heads and, interestingly, tribal households approached traditional healers 
less than non-tribal households. However, our data suggested that there was a negative 
association between income and frequency of traditional healer care seeking that was 
most apparent in the richest quintile in Odisha. 
It was found that private qualified doctors practiced in AP even at block level, but 
almost none could be found in Odisha, especially in Kalahandi and Malkangiri (the 
poorer and more remote districts of Odisha). In these districts, the PHCs and CHCs, were 
understaffed. The reason why fewer private doctors practiced in Odisha was people’s 
lower ability to pay, demonstrated by lower median MPCE (pattern confirmed by Na-
tional Sample Survey 2005-06: INR 460.32 for Odisha and INR 704.17 in AP). Our findings 
provided additional evidence to support this conclusion, as the frequency of accessing 
qualified doctors increased significantly with income in Odisha. 
Based on analysis of illnesses reported by people (juxtaposed against those reported 
by providers), it appears that NDAPs manage the most frequent illnesses, and thus fill 
a limited but essential gap in access to first contact curative healthcare in rural India. 
Similar to findings of others (Rohde & Vishwanathan 1994), NDAPs in our study were 
mostly male, with long-established practices of allopathy close to where they live, typi-
cally dispensing small doses of medicines when consulting patients, and charging a flat 
fee for both consultation and medicines. A new feature of NDAP services i.e. “on-call” 
services to respond to clients’ needs for doorstep curative care as-and-when needed, 
anytime was also seen. 
We found no signs of conflict of interests or “turf wars” between qualified doctors and 
NDAPs; on the contrary, we observed even some complementarity between the two 
categories of providers. 
NDAPs referred complex cases to qualified doctors, often by accompanying the 
patients. This situation explains why, notwithstanding legal restrictions set out by the 
Indian Medical Council Act (IMC 1956) on the practice of medicine, some experts in the 
Indian public health community suggest that the role of NDAPs should be reviewed 
(Yadav et al. 2009). Even certain government commissions made similar recommen-
dations. e.g. the National Commission for Macroeconomics and Health (GOI 2005d), 
a Health Ministry Task Group on training and accreditation of rural practitioners (GOI 
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2007a), and the NRHM. Additionally, a Task Force on Medical Education recommended 
a 3-year programme to train community health practitioners (GOI 2007b), and the most 
recent official attempt is to design the curriculum for a Bachelor of Rural Health Care 
programme (Dhar 2010). These programmes probably reflect the concern that the gov-
ernment should provide better than sub-optimal, first contact, primary curative care to 
rural populations. 
NDAPs in our study treated with allopathic medicines and were familiar with not 
just one or two brand names of allopathic drugs, but with several, which they could 
access without any difficulties. This suggests that representatives and retailers of the 
pharmaceutical industry succeed in bringing drug related information (and drugs as 
well) to NDAPs in the same way as they reach qualified prescribers. As this study was 
not an empirical evaluation of the clinical quality of care of NDAPs, it is not possible to 
comment on the adequacy of use of the drugs they mentioned. However, the ease of 
access to drugs by persons lacking formal certification (like the NDAPs) and the absence 
of effective regulatory oversight of drug distribution in India raise some concern about 
practices of dispensing of medicines reported through this study. 
The main study limitation was that due to resource constraints we could interview 
fewer first-contact providers than all those who were available. However, some of the 
providers most frequently approached as identified and located from people’s descrip-
tions in the FGDs were interviewed. Thus, these interviews provide a profile of providers 
that people accessed frequently in the study communities. 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, our study showed that the rural population in India indicates a need for 
“consult- cum-dispense” healthcare services for most common illnesses to be delivered 
most hours of the day and at doorstep (or at least served in or near their village). This 
treatment-trail for primary curative care has evolved unguided and unnoted by the 
formal system. The architecture of this treatment trail is crafted by the demand side, 
and has been solidified by the propagation of NDAPs practicing at village level. If the 
public sector should meet this health need, clearly the bottleneck would be not merely 
the insufficient number of doctors actually serving in PHCs and CHCs in rural areas. 
The policy conclusion is that services have to address the need expressed by people 
for more mobile, proximate - virtually doorstep – primary curative care that should 
combine consultation and dispensing of medicines, and would function many more 
hours. NDAPs fill a demand for primary curative care, with a new treatment-mix which 
the public system is not able to satisfy in rural India under existing operating conditions. 
The de-facto diffidence about (i) the need of rural populations for very different services 
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than those planned under the existing 3-tier public system, and (ii) the important role 
of NDAPs in responding to the demand for these primary curative healthcare services, 
irrespective of policies or law, seems rather incongruous. 
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among rural poor in India by reference to Engel’s law
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ABSTRACT
Community-Based Health Insurance (CBHI) (a.k.a. micro health insurance) is a contribu-
tory health insurance among rural poor in developing countries. As CBHI schemes typically 
function with no subsidy income, the schemes’ expenditures cannot exceed their premium 
income. A good estimate of Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) among the target population affiliating 
on a voluntary basis is therefore essential for package design. Previous estimates of WTP 
reported materially and significantly different WTP levels across locations (even within one 
state), making it necessity to base estimates on household surveys. This is time-consuming 
and expensive. This study seeks to identify a coherent anchor for local estimation of WTP 
without having to rely on household surveys in each CBHI implementation. Using data col-
lected in 2008-2010 among rural poor households in six locations in India (total 7874 house-
holds), we found that in all locations WTP expressed as percentage of income decreases with 
household income. This reminds of Engel’s law on food expenditures. We checked several 
possible anchors: overall income, discretionary income and food expenditures. We compared 
WTP expressed as percentage of these anchors, by calculating the Coefficient of Variation 
(for inter-community variation) and Concentration indices (for intra-community variation). 
The Coefficient of variation was 0.36, 0.43 and 0.50 for WTP as percent of food expenditures, 
overall income and discretionary income, respectively. In all locations the concentration in-
dex for WTP as percentage of food expenditures was the lowest. Thus, food expenditures had 
the most consistent relationship with WTP within each location and across the six locations. 
These findings indicate that like food, health insurance is considered a necessity good even 
by people with very low income and no prior experience with health insurance. We conclude 
that the level of WTP could be estimated based on each community’s food expenditures, 
and that this information can be obtained everywhere without having to conduct household 
surveys. 
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5.1 BACKGROUND
Policy makers across the world have recognized that adequate access to health services 
is important for the entire population and that this cannot be achieved without a well-
functioning health financing system. Member States of the World Health Organization 
committed in 2005 to develop their health financing systems so that all people have 
access to services and do not suffer financial hardship paying for them (World Health As-
sembly resolution 58.33). Health financing policies across the world promote risk pool-
ing mechanisms in order to move away from direct payments (out-of-pocket spending 
at the point of delivery) and achieve universal health coverage(James & Savedoff 2010, 
WHO 2010).
Most developing countries cannot mandate affiliation to health insurance because 
the vast majority of the population is living and working in the “informal sector” (Bac-
chetta et al. 2009, Pratap & Quintin 2006). This is also why these countries cannot fully 
subsidize health insurance forever for all people in the informal sector. Thus, voluntary 
affiliation to a contributory scheme like Community-Based Health Insurance (CBHI) or 
micro health insurance is the most likely route to achieve broad-based health insurance 
coverage in settings where governments can neither mandate nor subsidize the full 
cost. India is a case in point, as a large share of its population lives in rural areas, works 
in the informal sector and does not pay taxes. Notwithstanding a policy of delivering 
healthcare through the public sector, these facilities commonly suffer from shortages in 
qualified staff and supplies, especially in rural and peripheral areas (Reddy et al. 2011a, 
Peters et al. 2002, Berman 1998). Therefore, the rural poor mostly seek care with private 
practitioners (NSSO 2006) and have to bear the costs of care out-of-pocket at the point 
of delivery. It has been shown that often, rural poor pay for this care by resorting to bor-
rowing or selling assets (Binnendijk et al. 2012c). Additionally, rural poor cannot easily 
find health insurance in rural areas; the more likely option to become insured in rural 
areas is through CBHI providing affordable (but partial) health insurance coverage (Bhat 
& Jain 2006, Devadasan 2006, Ahuja 2005, NCMH 2005). CBHI schemes are organized 
mostly by NGOs serving poorer segments of society on a not-for-profit voluntary basis. 
One of the strengths of CBHI is keeping transaction costs low and tailoring the benefits 
to suit local needs (Bhat & Jain 2006, Ahuja 2005). Typically, CBHI schemes do not benefit 
from premium subsidy. Therefore, the expenditure on benefits is limited to premium 
income of single schemes. It is self-explanatory that people will buy health insurance 
voluntarily only if the package suits their needs, if the premium is affordable, and if they 
expect the contract to be executed as promised. Estimating what people are willing to 
pay for health insurance (WTP) before the insurance can be launched is thus essential 
because it defines the financial boundaries within which a to design the package. 
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Contingent valuation is the method used most often to get information regarding 
WTP; people are asked to declare their WTP for something that is not yet available in the 
market (Dror & Koren 2012). It should be noted that the query about WTP is not an offer 
to sell a product; it is a hypothetical question about a product that does not yet exist, i.e. 
it precedes the offer of insurance. This query has often been part of a household survey. 
However the time and cost needed to conduct household surveys render this method of 
data acquisition impractical for generalized implementation of CBHI. Furthermore, it has 
been found, both in India and Nigeria, that WTP for health insurance differs significantly 
and materially across locations even within the same country or district (Onwujekwe et 
al. 2010a, Dror et al. 2007b), suggesting that it is necessary to estimate WTP for every 
location separately. The purpose of this study is to identify a coherent anchor for such 
local estimation of WTP without having to carry out a household survey.
Several studies have looked at factors influencing the level of WTP for health insur-
ance in developing countries, such as economic and socio-demographic status of 
respondents, availability of healthcare facilities, financial exposure to healthcare costs. 
However, variables that significantly explain WTP in one study were not significant in 
other studies (Dror & Koren 2012). Household income (or income-proxy) turned out to be 
a positive predictor of WTP in many studies (Onwujekwe et al. 2010a, Gustafsson-Wright 
et al. 2009, Lofgren et al. 2008, Dror et al. 2007b, Barnighausen et al. 2007, Ying et al. 2007, 
Dong et al. 2005, Asfaw & von Braun 2004, Binam et al. 2004, Dong et al. 2003c, Dong 
et al. 2003a, Masud et al. 2003, Mathiyazhagan 1998, Asenso-Okyere et al. 1997). This 
finding is not surprising and tallies with the prevalent practice in developed countries 
to price social health insurance premiums as a fixed percentage of household income 
(Saltman et al. 2004). On the other hand, it has also been shown that while nominal WTP 
increases with income, when expressed as a percentage of income, WTP decreases as 
income increases. This relationship between WTP and income reminds of Engel’s Law, 
the important observation in economics stating that the proportion of income spent 
on food decreases as income increases, even if actual expenditure on food rises (Perthel 
1975, Engel 1957). This finding relating to WTP for health insurance suggests that similar 
to food, health insurance should be considered a ‘necessity good’ rather than a ‘luxury 
good’, i.e. goods that people cannot live without and the demand for which is not eas-
ily reduced even when times are tough. We therefore queried whether the cost of a 
necessary commodity like food could serve as a better anchor for estimation of WTP, 
rather than disposable income or total household income. We tested our hypotheses 
by comparing data from six rural locations in India to identify the anchor that, in every 
location separately (intra-community) as well as across the locations (intercommunity), 
showed the most consistent relation with WTP.
Willingness-to-pay for health insurance
81
5.2 DATA AND METHODS
5.2.1 Setting and sampling
We used data from household surveys we conducted in rural areas of six Indian locations. 
Two were undertaken in 2008 in Warangal and Karimnagar districts in Andhra Pradesh; 
three in 2009 in Kalahandi, Khorda and Malkangiri districts in Odisha; and the last in 2010 
in Gaya district in Bihar. These surveys formed part of a baseline study prior to launching a 
development project among members of local Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), 
and the locations were selected in agreement with the implementing local NGOs: CDF 
in Andhra Pradesh; Madhyam Foundation in Odisha (comprising 11 grassroots NGOs: 
Parivartan, PUSPAC, SOMKS, SDS, ODC (Malkangiri); Mahashakti Foundation, DAPTA, Lok 
Yojana, Sanginee (Kalahandi); MVPS, DSS (Khorda)) and BASIX in Bihar.
We followed a two-stage sampling procedure in each location. In stage one, villages 
were selected; In Warangal and Karimnagar the survey was conducted in 8 and 12 villages 
respectively listed by the local NGOs; in Kalahandi, Khorda and Malkangiri respectively 
27, 22 and 31 villages were randomly sampled from lists provided by the local NGOs; and 
in Gaya, 50 villages were selected randomly from the Census 2001 registry of villages. In 
stage two, in each selected village, households were sampled randomly by applying the 
“four winds” (or “line sampling”) technique (Som 1996). The overall response rate of the 
survey was 100% because most people were keen to participate and there was always a 
willing adult in the household who could respond. 
The households (except in Gaya) were sampled in two cohorts of equal size: member 
and non-member households. Households were defined as “Members” if at least one 
person participated in a Self-Help-Group linked to partner-NGOs; unaffiliated house-
holds were “Non-members”. In Gaya only non-member households were sampled. As we 
found no significant difference in WTP levels between the “member” and “non-member” 
sub-cohorts in the same locations, we aggregated the two sub-cohorts for the purpose 
of the analysis reported here. Sample size was 625 households in Warangal (2429 indi-
viduals), 1089 in Karimnagar (4328 individuals), 1805 in Kalahandi (8173 individuals), 
1758 in Khorda (9049 individuals), 1597 in Malkangiri (7326 individuals), and 1000 in 
Gaya (6607 individuals). 100% of the sampled households were rural.
The survey questionnaire was translated from English into the local languages (Telugu, 
Oriya and Hindi respectively for AP, Odisha and Bihar), back translated for verification, 
and pre-tested among 80 households per language. Surveyors fluent in local dialects 
conducted the interviews. We obtained verbal informed consent of the respondents 
prior to interviews, and kept confidential participants’ names in data recording and 
analysis. Our research tools were reviewed for ethical compliance by an ad-hoc advisory 
committee, as at the time of the rollout of the survey there was no local ethics commit-
tee in place in Odisha, India. We however held a two-day workshop in preparation of the 
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study in which we discussed the ethical aspects of the study with scholars and senior 
scholars from India and other countries.
5.2.2 Data
With the use of the household survey questionnaire we queried about expenditures 
on many items of household consumption in order to obtain a proxy for household 
income (Grosh & Glewwe 2000). We followed the method as adopted by the Indian Na-
tional Sample Survey Organization (NSSO 2008). These items of consumer expenditures 
included expenditures on food, tobacco, alcohol, fuel, gas, electricity, transportation, 
household disposables, toilet articles, entertainment, telephone, internet, (house) rent, 
consumer taxes, water fees and domestic servants for last 30 days and expenditures on 
bedding, clothing, footwear, education, household durables, agricultural equipment/
inputs, life-stock, business inputs, repair/maintenance, holidays, functions and insur-
ance premiums for last 12 months. All these expenditure items, normalized per person 
per month, serve as our proxy for socio-economic status and are labelled ‘income-proxy’. 
Our income-proxy does not include health expenditure, unlike the National Sample 
Survey Organization (Flores et al. 2008, Wagstaff 2008).
We also estimated “discretionary income”, i.e. the income available to households 
after paying for food (Imber & Toffler 2008). Stated differently, discretionary income is 
income-proxy minus food expenditures per person per month. Discretionary income is 
sometimes defined as disposable income, i.e. total income minus necessities. For people 
living in the Western world expenditures on water, fuel and electricity are considered 
necessities besides food. For the rural poor populations we dealt with in this paper, pay-
ing for necessities meant something quite different. For example, the water consumed is 
sourced from wells or streams and does not command payment. Most of the necessary 
fuel (to cook or heat for instance) is gathered from sources that do not require payment, 
e.g. cow dung cakes, crop residue or wood collected in the field; most of the other fuel 
is not a necessity good as most people don’t have motorized transportation. And finally, 
electricity does not exist everywhere and is not always paid for. Therefore food is the 
only generally applicable necessity good which is retained in this analysis.
In the survey questionnaire we also queried about caste, education and occupation of 
the household head, household size and other indicators of demographics and socio-
economic status of the household. The government of India has “scheduled” certain 
backward Indian classes or groups in order to promote their welfare: Scheduled Tribes 
(GOI 1950b), Scheduled Castes (GOI 1950a), and “Other Backward Castes”. Scheduled 
Tribes (tribals or adivasis) are mostly not Hindu and thus out of the caste system and are 
considered the most disadvantaged economically. Scheduled Castes (Dalits and those 
sometimes labelled “untouchable”) are considered at the bottom of caste hierarchy. The 
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list of Other Backward Castes is quite dynamic and changes from time to time in many 
states. All other castes are described here as General Caste.
Finally, we queried about WTP for health insurance using the Descending Bidding 
Game method in order to obtain the maximum values. First the interviewer explained 
what health insurance is, how it works and the coverage of the package: “To buy a health 
insurance you have to pay a premium per month for your whole household. This health 
insurance will then pay you back some of the money you spend on healthcare costs for 
your household members. Suppose we offer you a health insurance that will cover part 
of the cost of hospital, medicines, tests, consultations and maternity? How much would 
you agree to pay for that? If you are willing to pay more, you will get more benefits and 
if you are willing to pay less, you will get fewer benefits. But the condition is that all 
household members must join.” Then the interviewer started with the relatively high 
opening bid of INR 30 per person per month (around PPP$ 1.8), again emphasizing that 
all household members have to join and their premium must be paid every month. Every 
time the bid was not accepted, it was lowered by INR 1 until it was accepted or reached 
INR 0. The accepted bid was recorded as the WTP level.
5.2.3 Analysis
We conducted all analyses at household level (reflecting the condition that in this ex-
periment health insurance was available only when the whole household joined). For 
the analysis we used only households for which WTP and all expenditure items were 
available (in Warangal 1.4% of households had at least one expenditure item missing, 
in Karimnagar 1.0%, Kalahandi 3.5%, Khorda 6.4%, Malkangiri 2.6% and Gaya 0.2%). We 
also only included households whose WTP level was higher than zero; in context, house-
holds that were unwilling to join health insurance at any price could only express that 
through WTP equal to zero; as they are out of scope for voluntary affiliation of health in-
surance they were not included. The resulting sample is: Warangal 609 households (2.6% 
excluded), Karimnagar 1051 households (3.5% excluded), Kalahandi 1698 households 
(5.9% excluded), Khorda 1592 households (9.4% excluded), Malkangiri 1524 households 
(4.6% excluded), and Gaya 862 households (13.8% excluded).
We calculated WTP in several ways: as percentage of income proxy; as percentage of 
food expenditure; and also as percentage of discretionary income. The effect of income 
on these different expressions of WTP was checked separately for each location by using 
a concentration index, which measures how equitably an indicator is distributed across 
households with different income. The closer the concentration index is to zero, the 
more equitable the indicator is (O’Donnell et al. 2008).
We used STATA version 11 for all analyses. All amounts, reported in Indian Rupee (INR) 
during the surveys were converted into international dollars (purchasing power parity, 
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PPP$) using the exchange rate of PPP$ 1 = INR 16.130 for the survey conducted in 2008, 
INR 16.692 for the 2009 survey and 18.073 for the 2010 survey (IMF 2012).
5.3 RESULTS
5.3.1 Socio-economic profile
The socio-economic profile of the studied populations is summarized in Table 5.1. With 
income-proxies between PPP$ 1.0 and PPP$ 2.7 per person per day, all locations can be 
considered poor but the differences in poverty are quite considerable across the differ-
ent locations. Food expenditure was on average about half of the total income-proxy 
(ranging from 36% to 57%). This percentage was lower in the higher income cohorts, as 
one could expect by reference to Engel’s law.
In all locations, the majority of household heads have no or very little education (below 
class 5), but there is a marked difference across the locations in the percentage of house-
hold heads with higher education. The occupation of the majority of household heads 
differs across locations from self-employed in agriculture to daily wage labourers and 
self-employed in business/trade. The distribution of the castes is very different across 
locations with some locations having a very small minority Scheduled Tribe (1-3%) while 
in Malkangiri nearly 65% of households were Scheduled Tribe.
5.3.2 WTP for health insurance
Respondents of the household survey were asked how much they were willing to pay for 
health insurance per person per month, under the condition that the entire household 
had to be included in the insurance and the premium had to be paid for every person 
in the household. The average WTP values as reported in the different locations are 
displayed in Figure 5.1.
From the data in Figure 5.1 it can be seen that average WTP for health insurance varies 
greatly (nearly three-fold) across the locations; this finding tallies with previous reports 
(Onwujekwe et al. 2010a, Dror et al. 2007b).
Figure 5.2 shows the average WTP values by quintiles of income proxy in each loca-
tion. It is clear that nominal WTP increases when the income of the household increases 
and thus that there is also great variation of WTP for health insurance across income 
groups within the locations.
In all the locations studied, WTP values increased with income; this finding tallies 
with earlier reports. We wandered whether a fixed percentage of income could serve as 
an anchor to predict WTP of households for health insurance? We therefore expressed 
WTP as a percentage of income-proxy and checked whether this resulted in a constant 
percentage across locations and within locations (Figure 5.3).
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As can be seen, there is a strong intra- and inter-location variation in WTP as percent-
age of income-proxy. Even though relative WTP decreases in all locations as income 
increases, the decrease is not identical across locations (or relative to income quintiles).
Table 5.1 Socio-economic profile of the studied locations
Warangal Karimnagar Kalahandi Khorda Malkangiri Gaya
Mean (±SEa)
Income-proxy pppm 
(PPP$)b
79.77 
(±2.62)
79.17 
(±2.13)
29.46 
(±0.48)
35.65 
(±0.52)
29.97 
(±0.47)
50.24 
(±1.15)
Food expenditures pppm 
(PPP$)
31.34 
(±0.81) 28.59(±0.85) 14.68(±0.20)
20.49 
(±0.30)
15.92 
(±0.23)
23.09 
(±0.47)
Household size 3.89 (±0.06) 4.01 (±0.05) 4.52 (±0.04) 5.15 (±0.05) 4.58 (±0.05) 6.62 (±0.10)
% of total
Castec
Scheduled Tribe 1.0% 2.8% 22.0% 6.7% 64.6% 2.2%
Scheduled Caste 16.7% 20.5% 15.3% 28.5% 21.6% 35.3%
Other Backward Caste 73.1% 54.2% 52.7% 33.2% 7.7% 43.0%
General Caste 9.2% 22.6% 10.0% 31.6% 6.2% 19.5%
Education of household 
head
No education 42.3% 47.6% 53.9% 32.5% 69.1% 43.4%
Class 1-5 13.3% 12.3% 21.2% 29.5% 16.0% 12.2%
Class 6-10 29.0% 25.4% 22.4% 34.1% 13.7% 33.2%
Class 11 and higher 15.3% 14.8% 2.5% 3.8% 1.2% 11.3%
Occupation of household 
head
Self-employed agriculture 17.9% 33.0% 43.5% 26.8% 48.3% 28.8%
Self-employed business/
trade 18.4% 14.1% 9.0% 32.7% 5.8% 7.0%
Regular Salaried employee 11.0% 5.5% 3.3% 4.8% 3.9% 4.5%
Daily wage labourer 46.8% 39.0% 38.1% 19.3% 35.8% 47.9%
Not working 5.9% 8.4% 6.2% 16.4% 6.1% 11.8%
a SE = Standard Error.
b Income is proxied as monthly per capita consumer expenditure through questions on many items of 
household expenditure and expressed in Purchasing Power Parity International Dollar. 
c Caste is a proxy for socioeconomic status in India. Scheduled Castes (Dalits and those sometimes 
labelled “untouchable”) are considered at the bottom of caste hierarchy. The list of Other Backward Castes 
is quite dynamic and changes from time to time in many states. All other castes are described here as 
General Caste.
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5.3.3 Anchor for determination of WTP
Figure 5.2 illustrated that richer households were willing to pay higher premiums for 
health insurance in nominal term, but the higher amounts represented a smaller per-
centage of income compared to poorer households in the same location (see Figure 
5.3). As mentioned before, the relation between WTP and income reminded of Engel’s 
Law, an observation in economics stating that as income increases the proportion of 
income spent on food decreases, even if actual expenditure on food rises (Perthel 1975, 
Engel 1957). Prais and Houthakker (1971) introduced the concept that the shape of 
Engel’s curve can reflect a distinction between luxury and necessity goods like food. We 
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therefore examined the notion that actual spending on one necessity (food) can serve 
as an anchor for the estimation of WTP for another necessity (health insurance). To this 
end we checked the consistency of WTP as percentage of reported food expenditures 
within and across locations.
For a more robust comparison we also examined the opposite notion, that WTP is con-
sidered a ‘luxury good’ a household can only buy when it has enough money to spare. To 
this end we calculated discretionary income (income-proxy minus food expenditures) 
and checked the consistency of WTP as percentage of discretionary income within and 
across locations. Figure 5.4 shows the averages of both indicators for all six locations.
The data in Figure 5.4 indicates that the variation in WTP as percentage of discretion-
ary income across locations (average values) is more pronounced than the variation in 
WTP expressed as percentage of food expenditures. This consistency across locations 
was quantified by calculating the coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard de-
viation to the mean). The overall average WTP as percentage of food expenditure was 
4.6% (with a standard deviation of 1.6%), and the overall average WTP as percentage of 
discretionary income was 5.0% (with standard deviation of 2.5%). 
The coefficient of variation of WTP expressed as percentage of food expenditure was 
0.36 and of WTP expressed as percentage of discretionary income was 0.50. For refer-
ence, the coefficient of variation of WTP as percentage of income was 0.43. This means 
that WTP expressed as percentage of food expenditure varied the least across locations. 
We also examined the consistency of the indicators within locations, by calculating 
the concentration indices of the WTP indicators. This measure can show whether an 
indicator is distributed equitably across households with different income within the 
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same location (O’Donnell et al. 2008). The more equitable the determinant of WTP 
(concentration index closer to zero), the better it can serve as an anchor across income 
groups in a location (least income-dependent). 
WTP expressed as percentage of food expenditure has a lower concentration index 
than WTP expressed as percentage of discretionary income in all locations (Figure 5.5). 
This means that the amount a household spends on food is a much better predictor of 
WTP for health insurance than the amount available to the household for spending after 
paying for food.
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5.4 DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study is to find an anchor to obtain initial estimates of WTP for 
community-based health insurance (CBHI) under conditions of voluntary affiliation. The 
WTP represents the price that the household was willing to pay per person per month 
for health insurance that would cover part of the healthcare expenditures, within the 
WTP level. The prevailing practice has hitherto been to estimate WTP based on specific 
questions included in household surveys. We aim to identify the parameter that would 
yield the most consistent estimate of WTP and which could be established without 
resorting to household surveys, as these are costly and time-consuming.
We compared data from six locations in rural India; we found a positive relation be-
tween WTP and income, but this relation was neither consistent across income-groups 
within locations, nor across the locations. In a previous study it had been shown that 
there is a positive relation between nominal increase in income and in WTP, but a 
negative relation when WTP is expressed as share of income (Dror et al. 2007b). This 
characteristic of the relationships is remindful of Engel’s Law which expresses the same 
kind of relationship between food expenditures and income (Perthel 1975, Engel 1957). 
In our study, the described relationships between income and WTP repeated itself in 
all the locations, leading us to consider that (WTP for) health insurance behaves like a 
typical necessity good, like food.
We therefore checked the relationship between WTP and food expenditures and be-
tween WTP and discretionary income (the amount available after paying for food). We 
measured intercommunity differences by using the coefficient of variation, and intra-
community variations with the concentration index. The most important insight gained 
from these calculations has been that average household spending on food provided a 
good indication of the WTP for health insurance of the studied populations in all loca-
tions as well as across the locations. WTP estimations based on food expenditure were 
most consistent, more so than overall income and better than discretionary income. 
That said, this higher consistency in the measure of WTP across and within locations 
does not mean that the actual values reported across locations are uniform; naturally 
they are not, as can be seen e.g. that Gaya is a clear outlier; the differences in values are 
likely to reflect other (cultural, demographic) parameters.
It has been shown that on average WTP for health insurance can be estimated 
at around 4.5% of food expenditures. This estimation means that a simple and cost-
effective method to establish average food expenditures in a target community would 
also provide a reliable handle for WTP prior to the launch of contributory CBHI. This 
is a simplification of current practices, with no sacrifice to quality of estimates of WTP. 
This method would obviate the need to conduct costly and time-consuming WTP stud-
ies through household surveys, and would also remove confounding information (e.g. 
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inconsistent WTP as percentage of overall income or discretionary income, revealed in 
this study). The only reference data that would be needed would be food expenditure, 
which e being everyday expenditures e are much better known to all, and can be ob-
tained easily through focus group discussions or from data published routinely and in 
the public domain.
WTP estimated at 4.5% of average food expenditures was obtained based on data 
collected in six rural locations in India, which of course differ from each other in several 
socio-economic and demographic features. Before our findings can be generalized for 
other places, further research would be needed to validate that the estimated WTP is 
similar elsewhere. The actual anchor could differ from this 4.5% of food expenses in other 
countries, but we expect that the expression of WTP relative to food expenditure will 
remain the most consistent compared to other measurements. Further research to test 
that the relationship to food expenditures applies elsewhere would be able to confer a 
more general validity to our findings in rural India. Finally, further research could also 
refine the most effective method to extract information on average food expenditures 
in a community, for instance through focus group discussions.
The finding that WTP for health insurance behaves like a necessity good rather than 
a luxury good is quite surprising. Intuitively one could have expected health insurance 
to be a luxury good, in particular as the rural poor that were the focus of our study had 
such very low income, and hardly any experience with health insurance or insurance in 
general. However, these insights actually flow quite logically from a previous finding of 
the same authors that health-related hardship financing among rural poor populations 
(i.e. borrowing with high interest or selling assets) was considerable (Binnendijk et al. 
2012c). Therefore, it seems logical that people who are exposed to such financial risk 
would seek to reduce illness related financial shocks, and would consider affordable and 
relevant solutions as essential. It follows that the scoping of WTP levels among rural 
poor prior to launching CBHI can proceed successfully even among cohorts that are 
inexperienced with the financial instrument, when given coherent explanations.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
The first and most striking insight gained through this study in six locations in India 
is that WTP for health insurance could be estimated as a percentage of average food 
expenditure in the target communities. This is related to the second important finding 
that the relationship between income and food expenditures is similar to the relation 
between income and WTP for health insurance, indicating that even rural poor, with very 
little money, education or experiences with (health) insurance consider health insurance 
as a necessity good (akin to food). The average expenditure on food can serve as a better 
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data series for the estimation of WTP for health insurance than either overall income or 
discretionary income. Thirdly, the detailed calculations show that the level of WTP for 
community-based health insurance (CBHI) was approximately 4.5% of food expenditure 
in the six locations we studied in India. Further research could verify whether the same 
percentage applies everywhere; but we expect the relationship to food expenditure to 
offer best-fit elsewhere as well. Finally, the analysis described in this article strongly sug-
gests that it is possible to estimate WTP for health insurance without having to conduct 
household surveys to obtain essential data first; the only data source needed would be 
information on average food expenditures in the community. We submit that this can be 
obtained through cheaper and faster research methods, such as focus group discussions 
with target communities or, if sufficiently accurately available, existing data sources. This 
means that it would be much easier, faster and cheaper to implement CBHI among rural 
poor populations (in India) than hitherto, as one of the critical needs that required doing 
a baseline is obviated by the new method presented in this article.
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ABSTRACT
Objective Most healthcare spending in developing countries is private out-of-pocket. One 
explanation for low penetration of health insurance is that poorer individuals doubt their 
ability to enforce insurance contracts. Community-based health insurance schemes (CBHI) 
are a solution, but launching CBHI requires obtaining accurate local data on morbidity, 
healthcare utilization and other details to inform package design and pricing. We devel-
oped the “Illness Mapping” method for data collection (faster and cheaper than household 
surveys). Methods Illness mapping is a modification of two non-interactive consensus 
group methods (Delphi and Nominal Group Technique) to operate as interactive methods. 
We elicited estimates from “Experts” in the target community on morbidity and healthcare 
utilization. Interaction between facilitator and experts became essential to bridge literacy 
constraints and to reach consensus. The study was conducted in Gaya District, Bihar (India) 
during April-June 2010. The intervention included the illness mapping and a household 
survey. Illness mapping included 18 women’s and 17 men’s groups. The household survey 
was conducted in 50 villages with 1,000 randomly selected households (6,656 individuals). 
Results We found good agreement between the two methods on overall prevalence of 
illness (illness mapping: 25.9% ±3.6; household survey: 31.4%) and on prevalence of acute 
(illness mapping: 76.9%; household survey: 69.2%) and chronic illnesses (illness mapping: 
20.1%; household survey: 16.6%). We also found good agreement on incidence of deliver-
ies (illness mapping: 3.9% ±0.4; household survey: 3.9%), and on hospital deliveries (illness 
mapping: 61.0%. ± 5.4; household survey: 51.4%). For hospitalizations, we obtained a 
lower estimate from the illness mapping (1.1%) than from the household survey (2.6%). 
The illness mapping required less time and less person-power than a household survey, 
which translate into reduced costs. Conclusions We have shown that our illness mapping 
method can be carried out at lower financial and human cost for sourcing essential local 
data, at acceptably accurate levels. In view of the good fit of results obtained, we assume 
that the method could work elsewhere as well.
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6.1 BACKGROUND
A large part of health care spending in developing countries is private and out-of-pocket 
(OOP). India is typical: 70% of spending is private, of which 86% is OOP (Karan & Selvaraj 
2012, World Bank 2010). Moreover, private insurance rates remain below 5% (Ma & Sood 
2008). The dearth of insurance is surprising, given the high frequency and cost of borrow-
ing from moneylenders even for outpatient care and maternity (Binnendijk et al. 2012c) 
in addition to inpatient care (Binnendijk et al. 2012c, Peters et al. 2002), and the inability 
of rural poor to pay for non-communicable diseases (Binnendijk et al. 2012b) even as the 
prevalence of NCDs increases in low-income countries (WHO 2011a, Lopez et al. 2006). 
One possible explanation for low insurance penetration is that poorer individuals in the 
informal sector doubt their ability to enforce contracts with insurance companies. A so-
lution to the problem is community-based health insurance schemes (CBHI) (Bhat & Jain 
2006, Ahuja 2005, NCMH 2005, Ahuja 2004). These schemes are owned and run locally, 
at village level (Dror et al. 2009a, NCMH 2005). One of the hurdles to launching CBHI 
schemes is obtaining relevant information on local morbidity, healthcare utilization and 
other information that would inform the design and pricing of a relevant and affordable 
insurance package. A number of experiments with micro health insurance have relied 
on household surveys to obtain reliable local actuarial estimates and other information 
required for package design and pricing (Doyle et al. 2011, Dong et al. 2004, AC Nielsen 
ORG-MARG Pvt Ltd. 2001). Obtaining accurate local data is essential both because the 
income of CBHI is often limited and because of significant differences across locations in 
the number and type of illness episodes (Dror et al. 2009b, Dror et al. 2008, Dror 2007). 
However, household surveys are both expensive and time consuming. Thus a faster and 
cheaper method would be instrumental in promoting the expansion of micro health 
insurance. 
Our study is located in Gaya district, Bihar state, India. The main source of data on inci-
dence/prevalence of illnesses and hospitalisations is the Indian National Sample Survey 
Organization (NSSO) (NSSO 2006). The NSSO however provides information only at state 
level and not at district or block level, which are the more relevant units for CBHI. In 
addition, the most recent edition of NSSO with information on morbidity and healthcare 
utilization dates to 2004 (NSSO 2006) with an earlier survey in 1995/96 (NSSO 1998). 
And, health information sourced from local medical record-keeping does not provide 
sufficiently accurate location-specific data. 
This paper contains a description of a cheaper and faster method to derive quantita-
tive estimates of healthcare events through qualitative approaches (Jones & Hunter 
1995). The experiment we conducted is inspired by previous methodologies aiming to 
achieve similar objectives. For instance, Auray and Fonteneau (2002) suggested possible 
group methods using consensus-building techniques, notably the Delphi and the Nomi-
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nal Group Technique (NGT), to derive estimates from expert opinions on prevalence of 
hospitalizations, incidence of illness etc. 
In the Delphi method, individual experts that are not in contact with each other first 
provide their quantitative estimate to a query; then, each expert is informed about 
other experts’ replies, and invited to adjust the value (but each expert does so alone, 
without interacting with the others); this process can be repeated several iterations until 
consensus is reached (Jones & Hunter 1995, Woudenberg 1991). In the NGT, experts that 
are assembled in the same place at the same time individually write down their views on 
the topic in question and present one idea to the facilitator which is recorded. There is 
a group discussion to clarify and evaluate each idea and following this discussion each 
participant privately ranks each idea. This ranking is tabulated and presented. The group 
then discusses the overall ranking to reach consensus (Jones & Hunter 1995, Sample 
1984, Van de Ven & Delbecq 1974). It is noted that while there is some interaction 
between NGT group members to discuss or clarify ideas, other major group processes, 
such as idea generation and final rankings, are conducted silently and individually 
(Van de Ven & Delbecq 1974). So, while both the Delphi and NGT are methods to reach 
consensus, both unfold among non-interacting groups (participants do not interact 
and discuss with each other during the group process) (Van de Ven & Delbecq 1974, 
Van de Ven & Delbecq 1971). In interacting groups on the other hand, participants are 
allowed to interact and discuss with each other at each step of the process (generation 
of information, ideas, views, evaluation and final consensus) (Van de Ven & Delbecq 
1971). Interacting groups are usually unstructured (participants have complete freedom 
to think, review and synthesize together); examples are Brainstorming discussions and 
Focus Group Discussions (Kitzinger 1995). Non-interacting groups however, are usually 
structured (participants receive systematic procedural guidance) (Woudenberg 1991, 
Van de Ven & Delbecq 1974). 
Research in the 1960s and 70s compared non-interacting groups with interacting 
groups (Van de Ven & Delbecq 1974, Bouchard 1972, Van de Ven & Delbecq 1971, 
Bouchard 1969). Delphi and NGT have been found superior to interacting groups for 
finding solutions to problems (Van de Ven & Delbecq 1974), but when group interactions 
were structured to enhance exchanges among the participants during thinking, visualiz-
ing and estimating, results were better than with unstructured interactions (Lowry 2002, 
Hart et al. 1985). Moreover, Van de Ven and Delbecq (1971) found that the most optimal 
group processes occurred when a structured procedure entailed interactive discussions 
after the initial exposé of ideas/views. Bouchard (1972) found that group-results were 
enhanced when the groups consisted of carefully selected individuals who had some 
prior knowledge of each other and some practice of working or being together (where 
differences that might inhibit group effectiveness were minimized). 
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Our study entailed a variation of an interactive group technique, inspired by the 
non-interactive group techniques. We elicited expert opinion in which our experts were 
members of the target community that knew each other, whose opinions were obtained 
in a structured, interactive group situation. The purpose of the inquiry has been to de-
rive estimates of healthcare data needed to establish micro health insurance. We call 
this method “Illness Mapping”. With the view to verifying robustness of results of the 
Illness Mapping method, we compared them to household survey data from the same 
locations and period. Our working assumption was that if the Illness Mapping delivered 
useful comparator data in this case, this method could be used elsewhere as an alter-
native to household surveys for faster and cheaper resourcing of the context-relevant 
essential data. 
6.2 DATA AND METHODS
6.2.1 Setting and sampling
The study was conducted in Gaya District of Bihar state, India. Gaya district is subdivided 
into 24 blocks. We selected 7 contiguous blocks purposively because this is where a local 
partner Non-governmental Organization (NGO) intended to implement a micro health 
insurance scheme. The intervention included two exercises: the Illness Mapping and a 
household survey. Both activities were conducted during April-June 2010. 
For the Illness Mapping, we divided the 7 blocks into 3 clusters (northern, middle and 
southern) and selected 6 villages in each cluster based on distance from the nearest 
government primary health centre (0–5 kms; 5.1-8 kms; and more than 8 kms). Our total 
sample included 18 villages, (7 villages in the 0–5 kms category; 6 villages in the 5.1-
8 kms category; and 5 villages in the >8 kms category). In consultation with the field 
partner, we selected a male group and a female group in each village, each with about 
10 participants. The groups were gender homogenous to enable participants to speak 
freely on the given subject. There were 18 women’s groups (263 participants) and 17 
men’s groups (147 participants). 
The household survey was conducted in 50 villages across Gaya district, selected 
randomly (using census list of villages) from all 24 blocks in the district, proportional to 
the number of villages in each block. Within each village, we interviewed 20 households, 
selected randomly by applying the “four winds technique”, or “line sampling” (selecting 
households according to a predetermined staggering e.g. every second/third household 
starting from the centre of the village and progressing in the four cardinal directions) 
(Som 1996). In total, 1,000 households were interviewed, representing 6,656 individuals. 
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Verbal informed consent was obtained from respondents of the household survey at 
the beginning of the interviews, and from participants of the Illness Mapping before the 
discussions began. 100% of the interviewed sample was rural. 
6.2.2 Illness mapping
The Illness Mapping technique is an adaptation of two non-interactive consensus 
group methods (Delphi process and Nominal Group Technique – NGT) operated in an 
interactive manner. The adaptation was necessary because it was impossible to apply 
the Delphi and NGT as is (i.e. sending our experts a questionnaire and/or requesting 
each to write ideas individually) due to the limited literacy of the population. Rather, 
interaction between the facilitator and the group members became essential, especially 
as the option of reaching decisions by vote was discarded, in light of the finding in one 
of our previous studies in India that rural participants preferred to reach a consensus 
(Danis et al. 2007). 
Like the Delphi and NGT techniques, Illness Mapping relies on the knowledge of 
experts. Prior to the selection of the experts, our research team met with key informants 
in the village [health/development workers such as the Accredited Social Health Activist 
(ASHA), Aanganwadi Worker (AWW) or Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM), representatives 
of Self Help Groups, etc.] to get an overview of the village, its size, social segmenta-
tion, and a general impression of its socio-economic status. Using this knowledge, we 
selected our experts by applying the following criteria: 
1. They should be living in different parts of the village.
2. They should be sociable, outgoing and interacting frequently with their neighbours, 
so that they would be knowledgeable about people and events in the village. Not 
surprisingly, participants with higher interpersonal skills have been found to perform 
better in group discussions (Bouchard 1972).
3. Group members should reflect similar social or income groups.
In the Illness Mapping facilitators (of the same gender as the participants) guided 
group meetings to enhance recall of the parameters needed for the calculation of the 
prevalence of illnesses and utilization of health services. Such facilitated recall proce-
dure does not occur either in the Delphi or the NGT, but publications suggested that 
compared to unstructured interventions, participants recall the relevant parameters 
better when procedures are structured during the thinking, visualizing and estimating 
stage of the interaction with the facilitator (Lowry 2002, Hart et al. 1985). Considering 
that people with motivation or training have been reported to perform better in group 
interactions (Bouchard 1972), we motivated our participants by explaining that they 
were selected for this discussion from the entire village, and that the information they 
provided would help develop the right kind of health insurance benefits for them and 
the entire village. 
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With each group, we first obtained a rough estimate of the number of households in 
different parts of the village, the rough household size (i.e. number of family members 
that ate from the same pot), and the total population of the village. Then we asked the 
number of persons who had been sick over the last one month, and the nature of their 
illness. We then asked every participant to name, one after the other, all the illnesses 
they could remember. To facilitate recall, the facilitator prompted periodically by ask-
ing about specific illnesses by name, both common and not so common ones. We also 
enquired about incidence of hospitalizations and deliveries (during the last 12 months) 
including information whether the delivery occurred at home or in an institute. 
Consensus was reached through a structured group discussion of the final tallies, 
similar to the final round of the NGT. We presented to each group the final tallies of 
the main illness categories and frequencies of illnesses, hospitalizations and deliveries, 
and asked for feedback on the illness tallies (presented both as a number and as a per-
centage of the total village population). Usually participants chose to increase the final 
cumulative percentage. In the few instances where the group was not able to arrive at 
a single estimate, we noted the different estimates (usually 2–3 different estimates) and 
averaged them. 
Similar to the Delphi method, our facilitator combined all responses and fed those 
back to the experts, who then ranked all opinions/solutions to obtain a new “agreed 
value”, which was again combined and distributed. Like in the Delphi, the experts can 
re-evaluate their ranking and possibly change their original opinions/solutions (Jones & 
Hunter 1995). 
As in NGT, our Illness Mapping process occurs in a meeting. And, like NGT interac-
tion is limited in the first part of the process when each expert gives their response to 
the facilitator (in NGT this is done in writing). A group discussion follows, to clarify and 
evaluate responses, and reach consensus (in NGT, unlike our Illness Mapping, before 
discussion to reach consensus each expert ranks responses separately, and the ranking 
is tabulated and presented) (Jones & Hunter 1995, Sample 1984). 
Data obtained in group discussions were recorded on pre-designed data sheets; a sec-
ond person, other than the facilitator recorded the responses. Names and frequencies of 
illnesses7 were recorded; we classified the illnesses reported as acute, chronic, accidents, 
and undefined. 18 groups from 14 villages provided 8 or more names of illnesses; only 
these groups were retained for the analysis of illness types. Hospitalizations and deliver-
ies were counted and presented separately. 
7. The following conditions were usually included: (i) acute: fevers, diarrhoeas, body pains, respiratory 
conditions (not including asthma/COPD), TB and skin problems; (ii) chronic: asthma/COPD, diabetes, 
hypertension, kidney diseases, and cardiovascular problems.
100Chapter 6
6.2.3 Household survey
The household survey questionnaire included questions on general demographics (age, 
gender, education, and economic activity), socio-economic status (queried through 
questions on many items of household expenditures) and health status of household 
members. Following the method of the Indian National Sample Survey Organization 
(NSSO 2008), we consider the monthly per capita consumer expenditure excluding 
healthcare costs as a proxy for income. Respondents were asked about illness episodes 
in the household during the month preceding the survey. Using the replies regarding 
the illness (related to symptoms, length of illness, recurrence, medication etc.), we classi-
fied illnesses into four categories: acute, chronic, accidents and undefined. Respondents 
were asked about hospital admissions in the year preceding the survey and deliveries 
in the two years preceding the survey including where the delivery took place (home 
or hospital). The household survey questionnaire was translated into Hindi (the local 
language), back translated for validation, and pre-tested among 80 households in the 
area. Surveyors who spoke the local language fluently conducted the survey. 
6.2.4 Data presentation and statistical analysis
We used Stata (version 11) for a descriptive analysis of the household survey. We used 
MS Excel (version 2003) for the Illness Mapping data tabulation and analysis. 
The incidence of illness and health care utilization derived from the household survey 
are represented in percentages by dividing the number of cases by the overall number 
of members of the sampled households. The estimates derived from the Illness Map-
ping are presented as the mean and standard error of the mean (SEM) of all the group 
estimates arrived through consensus (male/female groups separately and all groups). 
We compared information obtained from male vs. female groups to ascertain that 
familiarity with local illnesses was comparable, and significance of this difference was 
assessed by Student’s t-test. When comparing the results from the Illness Mapping with 
the results from the household survey we considered as “good fit” results of the Illness 
Mapping that were less than two SEM of the household survey data and as “very good 
fit” the results that were less than one SEM.
6.3 RESULTS
6.3.1 Socio-economic and demographic profile of the sampled population
The information on socioeconomic and demographic status of the sampled population 
in Gaya (one of the districts of Bihar state) is summarized in Table 6.1. As can be seen, 
the population is resource-poor (income is about PPP$ 1.53 per person per day), poorly 
educated (44% with no schooling whatsoever), and the main source of earning is daily 
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wage labour (60%) and self-employed in agriculture (24%). As a comparison, monthly 
per capita consumer expenditure (not including medical expenditures) was INR 753 in 
rural Bihar according to NSSO (=PPP$ 1.39 per person per day) (NSSO 2011b).
6.3.2 Prevalence of illnesses
Local prevalence of illnesses is one of the main parameters for designing and pricing 
health insurance. We compared the estimate of prevalence of illnesses (the percentage 
of persons ill in the last month) from the Illness Mapping methodology with the conven-
tional household survey (Table 6.2). The comparison of the mean value of prevalence 
of illness obtained through the Illness Mapping and that obtained through the house-
hold survey were less than two SEM, and provided “good fit”. Furthermore, the results 
obtained from groups composed of males and females were not significantly different 
from each other (t test). 
Table 6.1 Socioeconomic and demographic information obtained
Mean (± SEa)
Income-proxy p.p.p.m.b (INR) 832.62 (± 7.05)
Household size 7.97 (± 0.04)
Share of population
Education of population (15 years and older)
  No schooling 43.67%
  Class 1-5 12.08%
  Class 6-10 34.55%
  Class 11 and higher 9.69%
Economic activity of income earners (15 years and older)
  Daily wage labourer 60.43%
  Self-employed in agriculture 24.30%
  Self-employed in business/trade 7.89%
  Regular salaried employee 7.38%
a SE = Standard Error.
b Monthly per capita consumer expenditure – our proxy for income – is obtained through questions on 
many items of household expenditure (excluding healthcare expenditures).
Table 6.2 Estimates of prevalence of illness from Illness Mapping and household survey
Proportion of ailing persons (last month) obtained from the Illness Mapping Proportion of ailing persons 
(last month) obtained from 
the household survey
Male and female groups combined Male groups only Female groups only
(±SEa) (±SEa) (±SEa)
25.9% (±3.6%) 24.5% (±4.8%) 28.5% (±5.4%) 31.4%
p = 0.587b
a SE = Standard Error.
b Test of significance between male and female groups (t-test).
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6.3.3 Types of illnesses
The proportion of acute and chronic illnesses in the Illness Mapping and the household 
survey data is shown in Table 6.3. Acute illnesses represented most of the morbidity 
under both counts (76.9% of all illnesses based on the Illness Mapping compared to 
69.2% derived from the household survey). Chronic illnesses were 20.1% and 16.6% 
respectively. The proportion of accidents in the Illness Mapping (2.0%) was lower than 
that reported in the household survey (5.0%). There were fewer undefined illnesses in 
the Illness Mapping than in the household survey (1% vs. 9.1%). 
6.3.4 Hospitalizations
The Illness Mapping estimate of incidence of hospitalization was 1.1% (±0.4) and the 
household survey estimate was 2.6% (Table 6.4). Data from the household survey gave 
a much higher estimate than the Illness Mapping. The difference was significant and 
material even after taking the standard errors into account. 
6.3.5 Deliveries
Data on incidence of deliveries and on percentage of hospital deliveries is presented in 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6. We found very good agreement between the Illness Mapping data 
and the household survey data on incidence of deliveries: 3.9% (±0.4) in the Illness Map-
ping data for all groups combined and 3.9% in the household survey.
Table 6.3 Estimates of types of illness from Illness Mapping and household survey
Illness types as share of illnesses:
Acute Chronic Accidents Undefined
Data obtained from the Illness Mapping 76.9% 20.1% 2.0% 1.0%
Data obtained from the household survey 69.2% 16.6% 5.0% 9.1%
Note: The above percentages for illness types were calculated for all groups together. 
Standard errors for these values are therefore not available.
Table 6.4 Estimates of incidence of hospitalization from Illness Mapping and household survey
Percentage of hospitalized persons (last year) obtained from the Illness 
Mapping Percentage of hospitalized 
persons (last year) obtained 
from the household survey
Male and female groups combined Male groups only Female groups only
(±SEa) (±SEa) (±SEa)
1.1% (±0.4%) 1.6% (±0.8%) 0.5% (±0.1%) 2.6%
p = 0.213b
a SE = Standard Error.
b Test of significance between male and female groups (t-test).
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The Illness Mapping estimate of hospital or institutional deliveries was 61.0% (±5.4) 
for all groups combined, while the household survey estimate was 51.4% (Table 6.6). The 
two data series were within the good fit limit, but results reported by the female groups 
were in closer agreement (very good fit). 
6.3.6 Cost and time comparison between household survey and Illness Mapping
Table 6.7 gives a record of the time and human resources required for the household 
survey of 1,000 households compared to the Illness Mapping for 35 groups. The com-
parison is limited to the core activities related to the two methods, since the exact 
related costs could presumably be context dependent (salaries, traveling conditions, 
accommodations, will be different in different locations). The table shows that Illness 
Mapping represented a reduction of 59% in work-days, i.e. requires less time and less 
costs than conducting a household survey. 
Table 6.5 Estimates of incidence of deliveries from Illness Mapping and household survey
Number of deliveries per 100 persons (last year) obtained from the Illness 
Mapping Number of deliveries per 100 
persons (last year) obtained 
from the household surveyb
Male and female groups combined Male groups only Female groups only
(±SEa) (±SEa) (±SEa)
3.9% (±0.4%) 4.4% (±0.7%) 3.4% (±0.6%) 3.9%
p = 0.293c
a SE = Standard Error.
b Based on the reported number of children less than or equal to 1 year in the household.
c Test of significance between male and female groups (t-test).
Table 6.6 Estimates of percentage of hospital deliveries from Illness Mapping and household survey
Percentage of hospital deliveries obtained from the Illness 
Mapping
Percentage of hospital deliveries obtained 
from the household survey
Male and female 
groups combined
Male groups 
only
Female groups only
(±SEa) (±SEa) (±SEa)
61.0% (±5.4%) 67.3% (±7.8%) 55.4% (±7.3%) 51.4%
p = 0.275b
a SE = Standard Error.
b Test of significance between male and female groups (t-test).
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6.4 DISCUSSION
In this study we set out to develop a reliable method that may in future enable us to ac-
cess the necessary data for the establishment of a micro health insurance in low income 
rural communities where data would not be available otherwise. The objective before 
us was to find a way to overcome the two constraints associated with data sourcing 
through household survey, namely, the cost and time required. The Illness Mapping 
method we describe here seems to meet this objective. The information given in Table 
6.7 illustrates the advantage of the Illness Mapping method in terms of human resources 
and time required, which obviously translate into differences in costs (e.g. salaries, travel, 
accommodation etc.). 
The design of an insurance product requires estimates of the prevalence/incidence of 
the events covered by the insurance. Our previous studies showed that: (i) the incidence 
of illness episodes, and prevalence of hospitalizations and delivery is strongly context-
dependent and varies across locations even in the same country (Dror et al. 2009b) 
making it necessary to obtain local data. (ii) Prospective clients of health insurance in 
rural India are exposed to hardship financing not only in cases of hospitalizations but 
also in cases of outpatient treatment and in deliveries (Binnendijk et al. 2012c). In fact, 
this is even more pronounced in case of chronic illnesses (Binnendijk et al. 2012b). (iii) 
When expressing their priorities regarding benefits that should be covered by insurance, 
prospective clients expressed a clear wish to include both inpatient and outpatient ben-
efits (Dror et al. 2007a, Danis et al. 2007). It is thus clear that the information obtained 
through Illness Mapping regarding the prevalence/incidence of prioritized cost generat-
ing events is essential for the design and pricing of context-relevant health insurance. 
We followed a strategy of soliciting local information from groups rather than from indi-
viduals. We were inspired by group techniques, assuming that the small cosmos of a village 
community could be captured through harvesting the knowledge that is readily available 
to its inhabitants free of charge. Having failed to find a readymade suitable method in 
the published literature, we opted to utilize a combination of established methods and 
adapt them to our settings. Group approaches such as the Delphi and NGT have been 
used successfully and with high accuracy for business forecasting as well as for public 
Table 6.7 Number of working days required for Illness Mapping and household survey
Illness Mapping Household survey
Preparation (including translation of tools, training of interviewers and pre-test) 3 days 8 days
Field work (with 1 supervisor and 4 or 5 interviewers) 18 days 30 days
Data entry (1 person) 1 day 20 days
Data cleaning and analysis (1 person) 8 days 14 days
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policy (Hilbert et al. 2009, Basu & Schroeder 1977). We adopted the criteria for resourcing 
quantitative information from qualitative non-interacting groups such as Delphi and NGT 
(Jones & Hunter 1995, Van de Ven & Delbecq 1974), and modified those to take account 
of the advantages of interactive group situations in which the discussions are moderated 
and facilitated rather than left to chance (as often happens in exploratory brainstorming 
groups or focus groups (Kitzinger 1995)). Such structured group methods are based on the 
principle of collective intelligence (Surowiecki 2004), or group intelligence that emerges 
through managed consensus decision making (Hart et al. 1985). 
Our method was based on small group discussions with people who were marginally 
literate and numerate, but nonetheless experts or valid representatives of their village 
communities. They were chosen (with the help of our partner NGO staff who had prior 
access to the village) for their social attributes and their knowledge of households in 
their own neighbourhood in the village. In each village we carefully identified such 
participants and facilitated their interaction to obtain estimates for the prevalence of 
illness for the entire village. Other key contacts in the village such as teachers, village 
head, and health workers could also be recruited to provide similar information if there 
were no prior links with the village. 
We organized gender homogenous groups in each village to ensure that both men 
and women would be able to express themselves freely. We thought that women, 
who are usually caregivers, might be more familiar with illnesses than men. However 
we found no statistical difference between the estimates given by men’s and women’s 
groups. We found it more difficult to assemble men’s groups as men were usually away 
during the day. From this experience we infer that Illness Mapping could be extracted 
from interactions with either gender of respondents, and that women’s groups are likely 
to be easier to assemble than men. 
Our method had to be adjusted to the field reality of low literacy which meant that 
written consensus and voting was not the best option and so we employed a strat-
egy which involved everyone in a sequential and structured interaction. Our structure 
emerged from the motivation, explanations, and facilitation techniques that we used to 
encourage accurate recall and steer discussions towards final consensus. 
We examined the potential of our new Illness Mapping method by comparing the 
results obtained with those derived through a household survey. We compared three 
parameters which are important for implementation of micro health insurance: (i) preva-
lence of illness for acute and chronic illnesses, both of which entail cost implications 
which can be much higher in the case of chronic illnesses (Dror et al. 2008), (ii) incidence 
of hospitalization, as this cost is included in most health insurance programmes, and 
(iii) incidence of deliveries, especially hospital deliveries. We found very good agree-
ment between the two methods on incidence of deliveries, and good agreement on 
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prevalence of illnesses (in the last one month) and on prevalence of acute and chronic 
illnesses, as well as on the share of deliveries in hospital. 
We obtained a lower estimate of incidence of hospitalization from the Illness Mapping 
than from the household survey (1.1% (±0.4) from the first source versus 2.6% from the 
second source). This discrepancy could be the result of two types of memory effects that 
can lead to erroneous reporting by respondents: errors of omission and of telescop-
ing (Sudman & Bradburn 1973). While omission means forgetting or omitting to report 
an episode entirely, telescoping works in the opposite direction, i.e. the respondent 
remembers and reports an event as having occurred more recently than it actually had. 
The telescoping effect increases the total number of events reported in a given period. 
It has also been found that telescoping may be greater in face to face interviews as the 
presence of an interviewer and the face to face interaction may prod the respondent 
to give “too much rather than too little information” (Sudman & Bradburn 1973). It is 
possible that the telescoping effect may have resulted in an overestimation of hospi-
talizations in our household survey. In contrast, hospitalizations may have been under-
estimated in the Illness Mapping method as the group members may have only been 
aware of the longer duration hospitalizations in their communities and those due to 
major procedures such as surgeries. They may have omitted the shorter and less severe 
hospitalizations. This view is supported by prior evidence that longer duration stays and 
surgeries are more positively associated with recall than other hospitalizations (Harlow 
& Linet 1989). We do not have a definitive basis to determine which of these estimates is 
more pronounced, and only actual utilization data could indicate which estimate is the 
more accurate prediction. 
Data obtained either from Illness Mapping or from a household survey would usually 
be treated by insurers with some reserve, as both methods are less reliable than actual 
claims data over a long period of time. The Illness Mapping did not, a-priori, show any 
difference on this count relative to the data obtained from the household survey. In in-
surance business, it is therefore common practice to include a safety loading in premium 
calculations, to account for errors in assumptions or inaccuracy of estimates. 
The main advantage of the Illness Mapping method is that it is cheaper and faster to 
operate, and could replace a household survey for estimating morbidity and healthcare 
utilization, especially where local data is needed but not readily available. While we have 
tested this method in rural settings in India, we have no reason to think that it could not 
be equally effective in urban settings (e.g. slums), or in other countries. The estimates 
about morbidity and healthcare utilization are of course essential not only for insurance 
purposes, but also for health policy choices more generally. Limitations of this method 
include the need to establish good contacts with the study communities in order to 
identify the most suitable community experts. Secondly, high quality group facilitation 
is essential, by facilitators that must speak the local language and understand the lo-
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cal social settings (and probably be local). Finally, as the estimates obtained by both 
methods are predictive, one powerful way to evaluate the robustness of the estimates 
obtained would be to examine both Illness Mapping data and household survey data 
against actual claims data. Such a follow-up examination is needed to validate the ac-
curacy of the Illness Mapping as a generally applicable alternative to household surveys 
for the data in question. 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS
The effort to introduce health insurance among low income persons in areas in the 
informal economy requires that the benefit packages as well as the premiums payable 
will be customized to local conditions. Evidence has shown that those local conditions 
are context-specific and that one-size-fits-all simply will not do. This customization 
therefore is contingent on obtaining at least some local data on such pieces of informa-
tion as prevalence of illness, hospitalizations, chronic and acute illnesses, and deliveries. 
We have explored the Illness Mapping method on the assumption that it can deliver a 
cheaper and faster resourcing of the essential local data, at acceptably accurate levels. 
We have shown in this study that the results obtained through the Illness Mapping 
method were comparable to those obtained through household survey. We have also 
shown that obtaining these results costs less time and money than conducting a house-
hold survey. We therefore conclude that for as long as health insurance solutions must 
be adapted to context relevant conditions and that these differ from one location to the 
next significantly, the Illness Mapping method tested in this study and explained in this 
article may serve the purpose.
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Chapter 7
A model to estimate the impact of thresholds and 
caps on coverage levels in community-based health 
insurance schemes in low-income countries
Based on: Binnendijk, E., Koren, R., Dror, D.M. 
A model to estimate the impact of thresholds and caps on coverage levels in community-based 
health insurance schemes in low-income countries. 
Submitted. 
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ABSTRACT
Objective Community-based health insurance (CBHI) schemes are increasingly imple-
mented in low-income settings. These schemes limit the coverage they offer both by a 
limited set of types of care, and by applying thresholds and/or caps to costs of benefit 
types covered. The consequences of these thresholds and/or caps on insurance cover-
age have hitherto been usually ignored, for lack of data on the distributions of health-
care costs or understanding of their impact on effective coverage levels. This article 
describes a theoretical model to obtain the distributions even without data collection 
in the field, and demonstrates the quantitative impact of thresholds and/or caps on 
claim reimbursements. Methods We looked at hospitalizations and tests; we compared 
the simulated distributions to empirical data obtained through 11 household surveys 
conducted between 2008 and 2010 in rural locations (9 in India and 2 in Nepal). Results 
We found that the shape of the distributions was very similar in all locations for both 
benefits, and could be represented by a model based on a lognormal distribution. The 
agreement between theoretical and empirical results was satisfactory (mostly within 
10% difference). Conclusions The model makes it possible to simulate the expected 
performance of the CBHI (represented by the percentage of costs or bills covered). The 
aim is to match costs with local levels of willingness-to-pay for health insurance. This 
model makes it possible to determine at the stage of package-design the optimal levels 
of thresholds and/or caps for each benefit-type included.
